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This thesis is a strategic net assessment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and analyzes 
its present capability and desire to fight for its newly proclaimed state. It evaluates the military 
doctrine of Ukraine, the force structure and levels of its military, the various strategic and 
operational factors affecting the force, and the effects of the "ethnic security map" created by the 
former Soviet Union on the present-day Ukrainian military. Finally, it assesses four major 
components of military capability - force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. 
The findings of this study are that the Ukrainian Armed Forces can sustain short-term 
combat operations, but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential is there for the Ukrainian 
military to develop fighting capability to deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is 
a serious regional military power. It can defend its western borders and for the near term, 
provides a credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from Russia. This 
capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other components of military 
capability are brought up to projected levels. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The first post-Soviet Ukrainian government moved quickly to rationalize 
and reform the military forces which it seized from the former Soviet Union. 
This enthusiasm for reform was motivated by several considerations. First, 
establishing an independent Ukrainian army was essential in order to create a 
Ukrainian state. The creation of a military has allowed Ukraine to survive as 
a new independent political actor. Secondly, Ukraine was faced with a great 
danger posed by the gigantic arm of the Soviet army on its soil. By establishing 
a Ukrainian army (initially 750,000 personnel), these personnel were effectively 
integrated into a stable military structure and their disruptive potential was 
neutralized, when the link joining the Soviet Union to the military forces in 
Ukraine was severed and when a Ukrainian military chain of command was 
established. From 1990-1992 the Soviet military's hierarchy of obedience 
disintegrated in Ukraine and a new Ukrainian one took its place. 
The military doctrine of Ukraine emphasizes the fundamental law of 
"reasonable defense sufficiency" in regulating the size and types of forces and 
the quantity and quality of conventional weapons and systems. This doctrine 
is defensive in nature, based on the principles of nonintervention, respect for 
the integrity of national borders, and national independence of other states, and 
rejects the idea of using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Although the doctrine depicts the democratic values of Ukraine, it does not 
reflect the existing realities of the developing world and the European situation. 
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As a result, many Ukrainian policy makers and military leaders do not take the 
doctrine seriously. Due to these problems, the doctrine does not allow policy 
makers to determine the main directions of Ukrainian military policy. This in 
turn makes it difficult for Ukraine to create stable and legal relations with other 
countries. 
Based on the CFE ceilings and Ukrainian defense requirements, since 
independence, troop numbers have been reduced by at least 200,000. 
Currently, manpower stands at an estimated 450,000, although the defense 
doctrine sets a final target of 250,000, with an eventual aim to create a 
professional armed services. This process will take some time. 
To meet its political commitment to a non-nuclear status, the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces (UAF) have been participating in an accelerated transfer of 
Ukraine's nuclear arsenal. Progress has been immense in this area and as a 
result, Ukraine has gained support from Western states which favor this 
progress. Simultaneously, Ukraine has been attempting to develop a strategic 
defense concept against its most likely enemy - Russia. Although progress in 
this area has been slow, defense concepts are presently being addressed by the 
Parliament and Ministry of Defense. Another change which has been taking 
place in the UAF, which will possibly be of greater significance in the long 
term, is the restructuring and reform of the former Soviet military education 
system. At this time all the former Soviet military schools have been reformed, 
in many cases combining to form one institution; in some cases schools have 
been abolished altogether. These schools have introduced a number of novel 
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concepts designed to bring the military education in Ukraine into the twenty- 
first century. 
One of the more important problems affecting the UAF is the inherited 
"ethnic security map" of the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF). It has affected the 
present day Ukrainian military by creating an ethnic imbalance within the 
armed forces, thereby posing an important question as to whether or not the 
Ukrainian forces are loyal to their newly proclaimed state. Although the UAF 
have inherited the "ethnic security map" of the former Soviet Union, they have 
made some progress in reversing its effects. Ukraine has successfully waged 
a re-education campaign to educate the officer corps and its troops through 
various programs that would make them better "Ukrainian" soldiers. Although 
additional work is still required to make the UAF more patriotic, the officers 
and troops are generally loyal to the Ukrainian state and its people. 
The findings of this research is that the UAF can sustain short-term 
combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential is there for 
the Ukrainian army to develop fighting capability to deter war. Even in its 
current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military power. It can 
defend its western borders and, for the near term, provide a credible deterrence 
against a potential external threat from Russia. This capability will improve in 
time as military reforms progress and the other components of military 




The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a strategic net assessment of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and to analyze its present capability and desire 
to fight for its newly proclaimed state. The key question addressed is: "Are the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) a credible deterrent to incursions of neighbors?" 
Other questions that are used to aid in answering the key puzzle include: 
• What is the state of the Ukrainian military and is it capable of 
defending its own territory? 
• Does the military force structure and levels support the Ukrainian 
national security strategy ? 
• How do strategic factors, such as nuclear assets, the defense strategic 
concept, and the military education system influence the UAF ? 
• Are sociological issues (crime, ethnic dilemmas...etc.) breaking down 
the military's ability to defend Ukraine ? 
With the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, 15 new states rose as 
independent entities, radically changing in structure and character the political 
map of Eurasia. Ukraine's independence has marked the end of an empire in 
the region, since it has blocked Russian imperialistic desires over the remainder 
of Europe. Ukraine was the only state which seized a large, as well as the best, 
part of the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF). This assured independence for the first 
four years. The current dilemma is that many Russians still believe that 
Ukraine belongs to Russia. Russia sees the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) as a road to integrating Ukraine into a Union, which it needs for 
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economic prosperity. If Ukraine survives, there will be no superpower in 
Eurasia, however, if it falls, a new imperial Russian state may arise. To avoid 
the rise of a potential super power, it is therefore crucial that Ukraine succeed. 
Ukraine's military is essential to its survival, and subsequently requires careful 
analysis. 
Ukraine, a country of 52 million, approximately the size of France and 
rich in natural resources, is bound to play a key role in the new geopolitical 
structural arrangement in Eastern and Central Europe. "Ukraine is no longer 
portrayed as a "buffer" between Eurasia and Europe but as a "bridge" linking 
both halves of the European continent. Relations with the West have radically 
improved as Ukraine has launched its first serious reform programme and 
committed itself to denuclearization" [Ref. 1]. Since 1994-95, Ukraine's 
approach to foreign policy has altered, becoming more mature and professional, 
while relations have improved remarkably with the West and to a lesser extent 
with Russia. The main stumbling blocks to Western support for Ukraine were 
always the lack of reform under former President Leonid Kravchuk and the 
denuclearization issue. With the introduction of radical political economic 
reforms under Kuchma, Ukraine has received financial and technical support 
from international financial institutions and Western governments. In the 
realm of security proposals there have also been major advances since 1994-95. 
Ukraine has agreed to abandon its nuclear arsenal and in exchange received 
security assurances from three nuclear powers, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Russia.  These are not guarantees despite the fact that Ukrainian 
leaders continue to describe them as "security assurances." The "security 
assurances" support Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence, while 
opposing external interference in its affairs including the exertion of economic 
pressure. Western governments have also publicly reiterated in diplomatic 
meetings, letters of exchange and during press conferences, support for 
Ukrainian independence and opposition to any changes in its borders. "Since 
1994-95 there has been a perceptible change in the United States', and to a 
lesser extent Western European, understanding of Ukraine's strategic 
significance. The Republican victory in the 1994 US Congress local elections 
has reinforced the perception that Ukraine is a strategic ally, important for the 
West."  [Ref. 2] 
Ukraine has contributed immensely to the transformation of the 
geopolitical map of Eurasia. As the Soviet Union disintegrated politically and 
militarily its armed forces were left virtually intact on the territory of the 
previously conquered republics, facing the once largest enemy in the west - 
NATO. Many of the assets that Russia was heir to, roughly 50 percent, were 
outside the territorial borders of the Russian Republic. While Russia controlled 
second-rate forces of the Central Strategic Reserve, Ukraine aggressively 
gained control over first-rate force packages that were part of the second 
echelon front. According to Russia's defense minister, Army General Pavel 
Grachev, the forces of the Central Strategic Reserve inherited by Russia, 
compared to those gained by Ukraine were described as follows: 
We received districts, divisions, units and subunits that were 
strategically secondary or even in the districts, that should war 
break out, would have been busy mobilizing and training 
people...These were virtually all noncombat units..understaffed... 
and lacking in appropriate equipment; all our best gear was on the 
first strategic defense line, in the Western and Northern Groups 
of Forces and those districts in Ukraine.    [Ref. 3] 
In light of the actual forces present in the Russian republic and their 
reserve nature, and compared to the forces that Ukraine inherited, it would 
seem that Ukraine is in a window of relative superiority. A senior officer of the 
Moscow General Staff stated that the forces in Ukraine could "easily defeat the 
whole of Russia in a matter of days" [Ref. 4]. Whether or not this is actually 
possible is of little consequence as the perception would be enough to prevent 
any conventional offensive military action against Ukraine. 
After Ukraine "nationalized" all former Soviet forces (with the exception 
of strategic forces) stationed on their territory they claimed over 750,000 men 
of ground, air and air defense forces (this number swelling up to one million 
after troops from service in other republics returned). Impelled in part by a 
newly acquired sense of national (or regional) patriotism and socio-economic 
considerations, most troops agreed to remain in Ukraine. Subsequently, a great 
majority of troops swore allegiance to the newly formed Ukrainian independent 
state.  [Ref. 5] 
As a rule, military institutions of most rising states have a tendency to 
resemble those of highly developed ones. Ukraine is no exception and has 
inherited military traditions, institutions and organization from its former 
imperial "mother country." Since Ukraine gained control from the former 
Soviet Union a simultaneously large, diversified, but modern and well-equipped 
force contingent, the process of building Ukraine's armed forces has been one 
of reform rather than one of starting anew.  [Ref. 6] 
This thesis is divided into four major parts and employs a structural 
approach, shown in Figure 1. Part One: The Seeds of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces, consists of two chapters. Chapter n, The Beginning and the Legal Basis 
for National Security, discusses the seeds for the Ukrainian national armed 
forces which were planted one year and a half before Ukraine proclaimed its 
independence. It shows the idea of a Ukrainian national army together with the 
goal of an independent state, which surfaced mainly as a grass-roots movement 
(Rukh), and which was evident in the Union of Ukrainian officers (UOU). This 
chapter also discusses how the new Ukrainian Parliament in 1990-1991 
legislated in estabhshing an armed forces after August 1991, and the take over 
of all conventional armed forces located on the territory of Ukraine. 
Chapter in, Military Doctrine of Ukraine, describes the doctrinal 
framework of the 14 October 1993 pronouncement of Ukrainian national 
security interests and policy which defined the main tenets on preventing war, 
building of the armed forces and preparation of the state and the armed forces 
in repelling aggression in a military-political situation. Attention is given to the 
key features of the doctrine, stressing its defensive nature, its principles of 
nonintervention, respect for the integrity of national borders and national 
independence of other states, and the rejection of the concept of using the 
armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Part Two, The Resources and Direction of the UAF consists of two 
chapters. Chapter IV, Force Structure and Levels, discusses the UAF 
reorganization to meet the principle of "reasonable defense sufficiency" and the 
ceilings established by the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), in 
1992. Such reorganization affected the restructuring of the military districts 
and the three service branches (Army, Air Forces and Navy). In the face of 
economic difficulty, the most recent debate of 1995 over further military force 
structure cuts, which are likely to be lower than the initially established 
ceilings, is also discussed. 
Chapter V, Strategic/Operational Factors Influencing the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces, assesses the nuclear assets on Ukrainian territory; lays out 
Ukraine's three options for a defense strategy focusing on the potential threat 
from the east; and describes the military education system, which will influence 
and frame how Ukrainian officers act and think in the future. 
Part Three, Organizational Interaction in the UAF, consists of two 
chapters. Chapter VI, Ethnic Security Map, describes the complex ethnic 
situation in Ukraine while it was under Soviet rule and shows how the 
established "ethnic security map" has affected present day Ukraine and its 
military, by creating ethnic imbalance within the armed forces. Content focuses 
on the theoretical aspects of the ethnic issue, by using the works of N.F. 
Dreiszinger, R.A. Preston, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. 
Chapter VII, Sociological Issues, covers a host of sociological issues that 
plague the Ukrainian military leadership, affecting troop morale, discipline, 
readiness and combat sustainability. The salient problems addressed include: 
force conversion and quality of life, language in command, the re-education 
program, military traditions and customs and civil-military relations. 
Part Four, Military Capability of Ukrainian Forces, concludes the analysis 
by applying four major components of military capability - force structure, 
modernization, readiness and sustainability - to the UAF as a frame of 
reference. By employing the data from Parts One, Two and Three, and 
applying it to the four components of military capability, I conclude that 
although the UAF currently possess high force levels it is a rather weak and an 
unsustainable force. Even though, this force is presently unsustainable, it does 
have the stinging capability to slowly and methodically destroy any external 
force that desires to interfere in Ukraine's sovereignty. 
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Figure 1. Structural Analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces UAF 
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H. THE BEGINNING AND THE LEGAL BASIS FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
Ukraine's endeavors to gain command of the military forces located 
within its boundaries may be traced to four prominent events: 
1. Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty 
2. The August 1991 coup attempt 
3. The appointment of defense minister of Ukraine, and 
4. The Ukrainian military oath campaign [Ref. 7] 
In this chapter, Samuel Huntington's paradigm - the hierarchy of 
obedience [Ref. 8] - demonstrates how command over and within a professional 
army is affirmed. By employing this model to our analysis, we can infer that 
in order to gain control over the military forces in Ukraine two tasks needed to 
be accomplished: 
1. Destabilization of the military hierarchy of obedience in Ukraine at 
the crucial point of subordination. The link joining the Soviet Union 
to the military forces in Ukraine had to be severed. Furthermore - 
within the military's legal body structure - the bond tying the officers 
located in Ukraine to the remainder of the Soviet officer corps 
needed to be cut along with the one linking the organizational 
bureaucracy of the military forces in Ukraine to the organizational 
bureaucracy of the Soviet military structure. 
2. Establishment of a Ukrainian military hierarchy of obedience with 
the Ukrainian state at the peak of this hierarchy, while promoting 
the transition of the Soviet officer corps situated in Ukraine into a 
Ukrainian officer corps. This, in turn, would create and maintain the 
Ukrainian military's bureaucratic structure. 
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Therefore, Huntington^ paradigm best depicts how the Soviet military's 
hierarchy of obedience was disintegrated in Ukraine and how a new Ukrainian 
one was constructed to take its place. 
The seeds for the Ukrainian national armed forces were planted long 
before Ukraine proclaimed its independence. As the power of Moscow declined 
during 1989-1991, hopes for an independent state with the idea of a Ukrainian 
national army, emerged at grass-roots. This occurred primarily out of the 
Ukrainian Popular Front "Rukh" and was soon joined by the newly established 
Association of Ukrainian Officers, a powerful advocacy group whose members 
included active duty, reserve and retired officers.  [Ref. 9] 
Ukrainian leaders knew that the number one priority in making Ukraine 
a viable independent state was to put as much distance between them and 
Russia as quickly as possible. The historic attitudes toward Ukrainians and an 
intimate knowledge of Russian imperialism made the cause for defense against 
Russian chauvinism an initial unifying principal in the drive for independence. 
The establishment of an Armed Forces was a significant instrument for success 
in this policy pursuit. The idea of a sovereign nation met wide popular support 
and became a demand of every national front; many in Ukraine believed that 
the formation of the Ukrainian national armed forces would aid in remodeling 
"the sick man of Soviet society" - the Soviet army. Ukrainian separatists 
became obsessed with creating their own army, as a requirement to 
establishing a sovereign state. The historical memories of the disaster of 1918- 
1920 were a constant reminder to many Ukrainian political and military leaders 
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who remembered how, in 1917-1918, the idealistic and antimilitaristic socialists 
controlled the Central Rada (parliament) and dissolved veteran formations loyal 
to them. The future of the newborn Ukrainian state was left in the hands of 
undermanned and poorly equipped volunteer units. In less than two years the 
Ukrainian Republic, defeated by the Red Army, ceased to exist. The new 
Ukrainian political leadership in 1990-1991 learned from this grave error of the 
past and was determined not to repeat it. This sense of urgency was greatly 
elevated during the putsch days of August 1991, when the Ukrainian 
government realized it had no army to defend itself with and that it was entirely 
subject to events in Moscow.  [Ref. 10] 
There was also a strong popular pressure for Ukrainians to create their 
own army after revelations showed the abuse of soldiers in the Soviet army 
which resulted in thousands of deaths and serious injuries yearly. Mother 
began refusing to send their sons as enforcers of "order" in hot spots on the 
peripheries of the Soviet Union, and Ukrainian parents began to demand not 
only humane treatment of their sons but also that they serve within Ukraine 
[Ref. 11]. Beginning with the formation of local committees in the fall of 1989, 
concerned mothers, from many regions of Ukraine, formed a national advocacy 
group, "The Organization of Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine" (OSMU), on 30 
September, 1990. Its key objectives were to bear down on the Soviet military 
establishment in order to improve the treatment and well being of new recruits 
in the Soviet army, to insist that all Ukrainian recruits serve only within the 
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territory of the Ukrainian SSR and to push for the formation of a separate 
national Ukrainian armed forces. 
These grass-roots movements, to a large extent, attained their objectives 
on 16 July 1990, when the Ukrainian parliament (Supreme Rada or Council) 
proclaimed national sovereignty for Ukraine and declared that "the Ukrainian 
SSR has the right to its own armed forces" [Ref. 12]. This provided a rallying 
banner for national army advocates and spurred a mandate for national defense 
legislation the following year. 
A.       CRITICAL EVENTS:  FORMATION OF AN ARMED FORCES 
By mid-February 1992, Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov stated that 
approximately 80 percent of the military forces located in Ukraine had vowed 
allegiance to the citizens of the country. At the time, Ukraine's newly chosen 
president was in command of the second largest army in Europe and 
accountable for the world's third largest reserve of nuclear arms. The 
possibility of a military coup as occurred in Moscow in August 1991, had 
virtually been eliminated. 
To have a total understanding of the UAF, it is first important to analyze 
its formation process. This process is described through an analysis of four 
prominent events. 
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1.       The Declaration of Sovereignty 
Although the Declaration of Sovereignty of 16 July 1990, recognized 
Ukraine's authority to have its own armed forces, the legal origin of the 
Ukrainian armed forces dates from 24 August 1991, when Ukraine declared its 
complete independence from the former Soviet Union, two days after the 
collapse of the putsch in Moscow. Paragraph DC of Ukraine's Declaration of 
State Sovereignty (Appendix A - Abstract from Ukraine's Declaration of 
Sovereignty) included the following conditions pertaining to the military: 
A. The Ukrainian SSR possesses the right to build it own armed forces; 
B. The Ukrainian SSR decides the requirements of military service for 
citizens of the republic; 
C. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR complete their military service 
obligations on the territory of the republic and will not be deployed, 
in a military capacity, outside of its borders without the consent of 
the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR; and 
D. The Ukrainian SSR emphatically states its determination to become, 
in the future, a permanently neutral state which does not participate 
in military alliances and one which will adhere to the three non- 
nuclear principles - not to accept, manufacture or acquire nuclear 
weapons.  [Ref. 13] 
It is crucial to note that the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet made no major 
endeavors to acquire command of their forces until after the August 1991 
putsch. Between July 1990 and August 1991 only, the popular front 'Rukh' 
agitated its desire to create an armed forces. In February, 1991, it hosted a 
conference for the Revival of Ukraine's Armed Forces and devised an outline 
to establish a professional, all-volunteer force. In July 1991, Rukh sponsored 
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a military congress in which over 300 Soviet officers participated. The 
Ukrainian Officer's Association was established at this congress and plans to 
form a Ukrainian army were adopted [Ref. 14]. These activities laid the 
groundwork for the organization of an independent Ukrainian military which 
officially began to form after the August coup. 
2.        The August Coup 
The unsuccessful coup of August 1991 launched a sequence of events 
that ultimately led to the ruin of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), the demise of the Union itself, and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Armed Forces (SAF). On the eve of the August coup, the military's corporate 
structure was already breaking down. Within the military's professional and 
organizational hierarchies, three fissures began to develop: 
1. The senior military had become politicized by internal opposition to 
a centrally-controlled Union and military; 
2. The junior officers had become politicized by the fragmenting state 
of their already inferior kving and working conditions and by the 
senior military leadership's lack of attention to their predicament; 
and 
3. Draftees began to be affected by the political movement for 
autonomy and independence. 
This fractionalization affected the military in three ways: 
1.   A number of politicizing forces severed the military ranks, separating 
the officer corps along generational lines; 
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2. Troops were deprived of a sense of institutional attachment with the 
armed forces or the Soviet state they were supposedly defending; 
and 
3. Military professionalism, formed over decades, was being dissolved. 
[Ref. 15] 
Defense Minister Marshal D. N. Yazov's command, which activated the 
armed forces in support of the putsch, further atomized the army by 
challenging the officer corps' professionalism. Additionally, the putsch 
fractured the corporateness of the Soviet armed forces into cross-cutting groups 
of those who strongly backed the coup, those who actively countered it, and the 
diverse opinions and postures in between. After the failed putsch, the Soviet 
military became particularly vulnerable to Ukrainian nationalization goals. As 
a result, the first solid steps in establishing the basis for the UAF were taken 
followingthe abortive coup attempt of August 19-21,1991. On 24 August 1991, 
the day that Ukraine declared independence, the parliamentary opposition 
stressed Ukraine's powerless situation during the coup, and suggested that a 
special session of parliament examine the issue of the creation of a national 
army and the nationalization of all military enterprises in Ukraine. The 
chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, Lepnid Kravchuk, on 24 August 1991 
determined: 
A. To subordinate all military structures deployed on the republic's 
territory to the USSR Supreme Soviet; 
B. To create a Ukrainian defense ministry; and 
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C. To form a Ukrainian armed forces, a republican guard, and a 
subdetachment in order to protect the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, 
Cabinet of Ministers, and National Bank.  [Ref. 16] 
3.       The Appointment of a Defense Minister of Ukraine and the 
Structuring of Forces 
Following the coup, Ukraine's relations with Russia quickly declined due 
to statements made by Yeltsin, on Russia's claim to reconsider its boundaries 
with neighboring republics which had proclaimed their independence. As a 
result, Kravchuk, reacting to outside tensions as well as rising domestic 
demands to sustain Ukraine's independence, stated that Ukraine would shortly 
create a republican defense minister. Also, a special commission was created 
in order to intentionally point out to the USSR Defense Ministry the 
subordination of troops of the three military districts on Ukrainian soil to 
Ukraine. On August 29, the presidium of the Ukrainian parliament ratified 
decrees, which transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, the border troops, 
interior troops, and military commissariats located on Ukrainian territory. 
Lastly, on 3 September 1991, after an extended session, the Ukrainian 
parliament designated Konstantin Morozov, a Soviet Major General of Aviation, 
as the Defense Minister. 
After Morozov's appointment, the Presidium of the Ukrainian parliament 
prohibited the redeployment of all military bodies and educational 
establishments on the republic's territory or over its borders. Additionally, it 
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prohibited the sending of military hardware from Ukraine without prior 
sanctioning from the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. 
In six weeks, Morozov finished a draft proposal for the establishment of 
the Ukrainian military, calling for the formation of a Ukrainian army via a 
mediated transfer of Soviet troops and provisions to Ukraine [Ref. 17]. On 8 
October 1991, the Cabinet of Ministers decreed to institute a Ukrainian National 
Army in the course of two years, with a temporary force of 450,000 troops. 
This figure was composed by taking an assumed European average of 0.8 
percent of the population for the size of a sufficient armed forces [Ref. 18]. 
Such acts were harshly criticized by the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) 
leadership. In October 1991, the Ukrainian parliament endorsed a packet of 
draft laws on national defense which ordered the establishment of the armed 
forces and national guard of Ukraine. 
This initiated a swift series of laws applied within the next coming 
months that laid the legal groundwork for the beginning of the Ukrainian 
national security structure and the formation and organization of the national 
armed forces of Ukraine. On 11 October 1991, the "Concept for the Defense 
and the Formation of Armed Forces of Ukraine," put into action by open 
declaration, implemented the rationale for the organization of the armed forces; 
to include ground, air and naval powers. 
Under the declaration, those strategic forces associated to the operation 
and defense of nuclear weapons and systems situated on the territory of 
Ukraine were to continue their operational subordination to central command 
17 
in Moscow until the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine was 
achieved. 
This idea permitted for the establishment of paramilitary organizations 
such as the national guard, border and civil defense troops. On 4 November, 
a National Guard was established and its commander named as Colonel V. 
Kukharets [Ref. 19]. The first units were 6,000-strong and drawn from MVD 
troops already stationed in Ukraine. A force of 30,000 was envisioned by April 
1992, to be armed with requisitioned MVD equipment [Ref. 20]. 
After the Supreme Soviet took control of all border guards stationed in 
Ukraine on 23 October 1991, the Law on State Frontiers on 4 November gave 
them something to police. The guards, under command of V. Hubenko, were 
to patrol Ukraine's land, sea, air, river, and economic frontiers, together with 
12 miles of territorial waters.  [Ref. 21] 
Overall, the "Concept for the Defense and the Formation of Armed Forces 
of Ukraine," designated the president, as the supreme commander of the armed 
forces, delegating to him a wide range of powers, including the right to declare 
a state of emergency or war, to call for a partial or full mobilization of the 
military establishment and to appoint and supervise its key leaders. 
At first, the Soviet General Staff scorned this attempt to create a 
Ukrainian military. However, by early November, the Soviet and Ukrainian 
defense ministries were forced to acknowledge it, and met at the bargaining 
table to discuss the division of the Soviet Army [Ref. 22]. Shortly afterward, a 
concept was developed by Morozov which led to the creation of a national 
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security structure: a Ministry of Defense and Defense Council was organized 
on 14 November 1991, and the Main Staff of the Armed Forces was composed 
in spring 1992. It also proposed the progressive diminishment of the forces 
found in Ukraine and the promise of social protection for military personnel 
released from active service [Ref. 23]. 
By agreeing to meet Morozov, the Soviet military acknowledged 
Ukraine's right to establish an army. Once the Soviet Army acknowledged the 
Ukrainian Defense Minister, the conflict broadened significantly. The dispute 
moved beyond the question of whether Ukraine could have an independent 
army, to the question of how large and what units would be excluded in its 
force structure. As time moved on, it was apparent that the Soviet military was 
losing control of its corporate structure in Ukraine. In a matter of time, most 
of the UAF fell under Ukraine's control. 
4.       The Oath of Allegiance 
In order to destroy the unity of the SAF in Ukraine and to replace the 
Ukrainian state as the new sovereign of these forces, General Morozov 
implemented a military oath of allegiance to the citizens of Ukraine [Ref. 24]. 
The oath of allegiance, like Ukrainian state-building efforts in other spheres, 
was "ethnic-blind." There were no ethnic or linguistic criteria associated with 
swearing allegiance to Ukraine; the only criterion was the willingness to serve 
the people of Ukraine. Before commencing with the oath, the government 
launched an informational campaign aimed in deterring the 700,000 Soviet 
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troops based in Ukraine from taking part in yet another coup. The massive 
informational campaign was conducted via the mass media and visits of high 
ranking officials to military bases [Ref. 25], This was achieved by convincing 
the troops that the creation of the UAF would be completed via a slow 
transformation process that would assure the social rights of all Soviet military 
personnel and their dependents. 
On 14 November 1991, the Supreme Council established an oath of 
allegiance, along with a procedure for enforcement, in order to guarantee the 
loyalty of the nationalized forces. Among the first to swear allegiance to the 
people of Ukraine was Defense Minister Morozov (Appendix B - Ukraine's 
Military Oath of Allegiance) to the people of Ukraine [Ref. 26]. Along with 
encouraging all military troops based in Ukraine to follow his lead, he also 
revealed a 16-point presidential order which described the procedures for 
implementing the Ukrainian oath of allegiance [Ref. 27]. The oath itself was 
voluntary; nevertheless, an officer declining to take it would be given a choice 
between serving his military duty outside of Ukraine or retiring. Enlisted 
personnel were presented with the same options plus the added option of 
carrying out the remainder of their duty in Ukraine before being sent back to 
their home republic. It was President Kravchuk's goal that the oath be 
administered to the entire force by 20 January 1992 [Ref. 28], 
Although General Morozov was unable to meet Kravchuk's ultimate 
target date of 20 January 1992, by mid-February nearly 80 percent of the 
military personnel stationed in Ukraine had pledged allegiance to the people of 
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Ukraine [Ref. 29]. Since the oath subordinated those who took it to the 
Ukrainian command authority, the likelihood of another Moscow implemented 
military coup became improbable. The oath of allegiance to Ukraine completed 
the process of separation and helped create a new military corporate body 
linking it to a new patron - the Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian military oath 
was civic and territorial rather than ethno-national. This all-embracing ritual 
joined those who swore it to each other and to the state, even though some 
swore allegiance for socio-economic and opportunistic reasons, thereby 
transforming the Soviet forces stationed in Ukraine into a Ukrainian military 
power [Ref. 30]. 
In the same period, since Russia was reluctant to institute a new oath, 
Soviet troops in other republics continued to serve under the old oath to the 
Soviet Union. By late 1992, Russian troops were serving under three separate 
oaths to the Soviet Union, the CIS and Russia. 
B.        INSTTTUnONAIIZATION 
Ukraine continued to institutionalize its forces and on 6 December 1991, 
an all-inclusive law "On the Defense of Ukraine" was established which 
summarized the contents of the Ukrainian defense policy, specified the 
responsibilities and duties of government branches and officials in the realm 
of national defense and provided for alternative service. Most importantly 
perhaps, it also defined presidential decision making with regard to declaration 
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of national emergency, war and mobilization dependent on confirmation by the 
Supreme Council.  [Ref. 31] 
By maintaining control over the military budget and appointment of 
prominent defense officials, the Supreme Council maintained a civilian control 
over the military establishment. Although, at that time, the appointed minister 
of defense and deputies were all military officers rather than civilian officials, 
this has since changed and, in 1994, Valerij Shmarov became the first civilian 
defense minister. Subsequently, Kravchuk appointed himself as commander- 
and-chief of Ukrainian forces in one of his first decrees on 12 December 1991. 
This announced the organization of the Ukrainian armed forces based on the 
troops of the three Soviet military regions spanning Ukrainian territory (Kiev, 
Odessa, Transcarpathian), as well as the Black Sea Fleet and "other military 
formations" deployed on Ukrainian territory, excluding the strategic forces at 
the time belonging to the CIS. By the end of December 1991, Morozov would 
claim that the legal ground for the UAF had been fully developed. 
On March 25,1992, the "Law on General Military Obligation and Military 
Service" established an 18-month service program; 12 months for university 
graduates, 3 years for those serving voluntarily as well as for female enlistees, 
and five years for warrant officers and midshipmen. Other than the rank of 
"marshal" which was eliminated and the rank of "general of the army of 
Ukraine" which was introduced, the past structure of the former Soviet armed 
forces was retained. Additionally, other legal acts arranged for the organization 
of a military intelligence service, military justice, defense conversion program, 
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system for social defense of service members, program for optional 
(nonmilitary) service, field service regulations, mobilization and other defense- 
related arenas [Ref. 32]. The technical, organizational, and personnel bases of 
the armed forces were to be established in 1992, and the entire procedure of 
structuring the UAF was to be completed by 1994-1995 [Ref. 33]. 
Ukraine continually sought the control of the forces on its territory on 
the basis of rightful "inheritance," although this inevitably led to difficulties with 
Russia. Ukraine's "right" to develop an armed force was disputed by Russians 
who set a broad definition on the idea of CIS regulation of "strategic forces," 
and who believed that Russia alone should acquire the USSR armed forces, and 
who purely disapproved of the idea of Ukraine being a well-armed state. 
The one major exception to Ukraine's ambition in building a military 
strong state was nuclear armies. The 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe led 
Ukrainian public opinion to be deeply anti-nuclear. This feeling was cast in the 
1990 Declaration of Sovereignty, which guaranteed Ukraine "not to accept, not 
to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons." This was further reasserted 
by a declaration of Ukraine's non-nuclear status on 24 October 1991. 
Ultimately, Ukraine vowed to remove all tactical nuclear weapons for 
destruction by the summer of 1992, and all strategic weapons by year end, 
1994. [Ref. 34] In reality, the timeline has shifted, and it is now anticipated 
that Ukraine will be "nuclear free" later than originally thought. Although, 
Ukraine has recognized that it surrendered a very potent bargaining chip when 
it gave up its nuclear capability, by the same act, it has picked up a sizable 
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amount of credibility from Western countries for striving to become a more 
democratic state. The non-nuclear status that Ukraine vowed to support is 
reciprocated by the funding that Ukraine is receiving from the West. 
Ukraine's Defense Ministry is currently in the midst of planning the total 
reform of the former Soviet military forces they have 'inherited.' Among the 
many issues that must be resolved are: a 50 percent reduction-in-forces, a 
realignment of the military education system, the development of a concrete 
strategic defense plan, the military's adoption of the Ukrainian language, the 
restructuring of the "ethnic security map," and a transition to a professional all- 
volunteer military. Clearly, the Ukrainian military reform is far from being 
totally "complete." 
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m. THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF UKRAINE 
Following the overwhelming endorsement received in the referendum of 
December 1991 (about 90 percent of the 84 percent that voted), Ukraine 
formally became independent on 1 December 1991. The first priority of the 
former communist, turned nationalist, government was to ensure that this move 
would be irreversible. Naturally, in the process of state building, the creation 
of Ukrainian national Armed Forces became crucial in Kiev's plans. The 
Ministry of defense produced a draft military doctrine for the newly 
independent state early in 1992. This draft was however, rejected by the 
Parliament in October 1992 and again in April 1993. The sticking point, 
apparently, was the declared policy on nuclear weapons. It was not until 19 
October that a revised draft was enacted into law. 
Section A of this chapter, describes the overall setting in which Ukraine 
is presently situated. Section B summarizes the ratified version of the military 
doctrine, while Section C provides comments and analysis of this document. 
A.        UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY AND SETTING 
During the Kravchuk era, Ukraine rejoined an international community 
of nations that did not always seem eager to accept the disintegration of the 
former USSR into fifteen newly independent states. The election of Leonid 
Kuchma as president in summer 1994 brought few radical geostrategic changes 
in Ukraine's foreign and security policies and certainly no major alternations 
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in its geopolitical orientation. Nevertheless, there have been noticeable changes 
in style and substance between Kravchuk and Kuchma. Ukraine is no longer 
portrayed as a "buffer" between Eurasia and Europe but as a "bridge" linking 
both halves of the European continent.  [Ref. 35] 
Initially Ukrainian foreign policy was based on the assumption that 
Ukraine, unlike Russia, was a typical "European" (rather than "Eurasian") state. 
This meant that the new state's geopolitical orientation would automatically be 
to the West rather than eastward to Russia. The first and most obvious 
implication of this policy was that Ukraine should develop friendly relations 
with its immediate western neighbors in central and southeastern Europe, 
Ukraine's "doorway to the West." In the development of bilateral (instead of 
multilateral) relations with its immediate western neighbors Ukraine was 
largely successful. Although the east-central and south-eastern Europeans were 
themselves looking primarily westward, they nevertheless appreciated the 
importance of securing their eastern borders and were therefore keen to 
reinforce Ukrainian independence and to cement good relations with the new 
state. 
Where the policy of "returning to Europe" broke down was in its 
implications for the relationship with Russia and the states of the traditional 
West. Here, the policy backfired badly, for it reinforced Ukraine's alienation 
from Russia and thus increased tensions. Under the presidency of Leonid 
Kuchma, Ukraine has drastically altered foreign policy. Kiev's foreign policy 
is no longer seen as a "zero sum game" (i.e., either integration with the West 
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and sovereign independence or reabsorption by Russia and loss of sovereignty). 
Instead, slightly closer relations with Russia are being balanced by improved 
relations with the West. The policy of balancing Russia and the West is 
hazardous and not entirely under Ukraine's control, however, given present 
constraints, it is difficult to identify constructive alternatives.  [Ref. 36] 
President Kuchma has changed Ukraine's foreign policy in a number of 
key directions. Ukraine no longer looks upon economic cooperation with 
Russia and the CIS as an unfortunate necessity, but as an urgent requirement 
in the light of the close economic ties inherited from the former USSR and its 
economic crisis. Political and military integration within the CIS continues to 
be ruled out by Ukraine, although bilateral cooperation, for example between 
the müitary-industrial complexes of Russia and Ukraine, is regarded as 
beneficial. Ukraine is, however, interested in raising its profile in the CIS by 
helping to mediate in local conflicts such as Moldova and Georgia.  [Ref. 37] 
The underlying structure of this section deals with the fear of Russia. 
Because of this fear, Ukraine puts forwards no territorial claims on other states 
and "does not acknowledge territorial claims on itself." It proposes that present 
borders must remain safe from violation and emphasizes that there must be 
"mutual respect" and "non-interference in the internal affairs" of other countries. 
Ukraine also stresses the principles of the UN, CSCE and the Helsinki Final 
Act. Many people in Russia, especially in the military, do not regard Ukraine 
with respect and do not treat it as an equal. Even those willing to tolerate an 
independent Ukraine see no reason why certain areas heavily inhabited by 
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Russians should be part of the new state. Other largely Russia-supporting areas 
(the four eastern oblasts and, to an extent, Odessa), upheld the independence 
referendum in 1991 because Ukraine looked like a better option than Russia. 
However, the present state of Ukraine's economy, might possibly lead them to 
reconsider their support if given another opportunity to voice their preference. 
This situation is of grave concern to Kiev, as Russians account for up to 21 
percent of the country's population, mostly concentrated in areas adjoining 
Russia. 
The origin of insecurity and potential causes of military conflict clearly 
relate to the Russian threat. Economic and/or political blackmail are feared. 
Indeed, many Ukrainian nationalists regard Russia's insistence since January 
1994, on charging world prices for oil, as an example of such blackmail. A 
worsening situation may soon follow. Moscow is accused of being the culprit 
in stirring up "ethno-national" discontent within Ukraine in order to destabilize 
the country, providing an excuse for intervention leading to a restoration of 
greater Russia, or, at minimum, seizing the areas displaying Russian support. 
[Ref. 38] 
Presently, the biggest concern for the Ukrainian Parliament is that Russia 
may be attempting to resurrect a Union which would absorb Ukraine into a 
similar setting found prior to its independence. Furthermore, since portions of 
Ukraine are constructed from parts of Poland, Hungary, Belarus, Russia and 
Romania, the issue of territoriality is becoming more disputed. This may best 
be depicted in the case Romania and Russia, who continue to voice doubts on 
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the territorial integrity of Ukraine. At the same time, the inability of Russia and 
Ukraine to sign a treaty because of territorial issues further complicates 
matters. 
B.       CONTENT OF UKRAINE'S MILITARY DOCTRINE 
The Military Doctrine of Ukraine has three sections and eight 
subsections. In the first section "Military and Political Aspects" the following 
subsections are included: 
• military and political goals and priorities of Ukraine in ensuring 
national security; 
• causes of military insecurity and Ukraine's attitude to war; 
• attitude of Ukraine to nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
In the second section "Military and Technical Aspects" the following 
subsections are included: 
• basic ways to ensure military security; 
• tasks of Armed Forces and principles of their construction; 
• training Armed Forces for defense against aggression. 
In the third section "Military and Economic Aspects" the following 
subsection are included: 
• the purpose and principles of military economic policy; 
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• preparation of the state and the population to the defense. 
Ukraine's strategic defense task is to protect the country's sovereignty 
and political independence and to preserve its territorial integrity. Having 
established that this is the fundamental task, the doctrine goes on to point out 
that the military doctrine is part of a national security, concept which also 
includes political, foreign policy and economic elements, that Ukraine does not 
constitute a potential enemy for any state, and its military doctrine is therefore 
defensive, and that "Ukraine can and should become an influential power 
capable of performing an important role in preserving political, economic and 
military stability in Europe and throughout the world." 
Ukraine's military-political goals and priorities in national security [Ref. 
39] are laid down as follows: 
A. The main aim is to ensure military security from external threats and 
prevent war. 
B. Relations with other states will be based on principles of equality, 
mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states 
and the principles espoused by the UN, the Helsinki Final Act and 
the CSCE. 
C. In implementing its foreign and military policies, Ukraine does not 
advance territorial claims on other states and acknowledges none 
against itself. It adheres to the principle of the inviolability of 
existing borders and respects the sovereignty and political 
independence of other states. It favors regional and global balanced 
force reductions to levels of defense sufficiency, but rejects unilateral 
disarmament and insists on solving all inter-state disputes by 
political means. Furthermore, it prohibits the use of the Armed 
Forces in dealing with internal political problems and argues against 
the stationing of foreign troops on its territory or on that of other 
states without their agreement. 
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D. Ukraine will maintain a "non-bloc status", but favors the creation of 
and participation in "inclusive" European and global security systems. 
It favors a general European security structure on bilateral, regional 
and global levels with the aim of improving mutual understanding, 
trust, partnership and transparency in military-political affairs. 
The causes of military insecurity and Ukraine's attitudes to war are 
summed up as follows: 
A. The main causes of military conflict and war are economic, political, 
territorial and ethno-national disputes. 
B. Ukraine will regard as potential enemy any state whose policy 
consistently threatens its military security, interferes in its internal 
affairs, or aspires to control its territory or infringes its national 
interests. 
C. Ukraine condemns war or its threat as an instrument of policy and 
aspires to the resolution of disputes and conflicts by exclusively 
political means. 
D. The country will not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. 
E. Its Armed Forces will be used only in case of armed aggression or in 
accordance with international obligations. In the event of war, they 
will repel the aggressor so that a political solution can be found as 
quickly as possible.  [Ref. 40] 
Given the global catastrophic consequence of nuclear war, the use of 
nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Circumstances have made Ukraine a nuclear 
power, but the country will never threaten or use nuclear weapons. It intends 
to become a non-nuclear power in the future and is against the prolif eration of 
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and related technology. [Ref. 
41] 
31 
For the military-technical aspects of the Doctrine, the key tasks in 
ensuring military security are as follows: 
A. In peacetime: forecasting the aim and character of possible war, 
averting it if possible; creating a military machine sufficient to deter 
aggression, check provocations or infringements of sovereignty and 
repulse possible aggression "by any state (or coalition of states); 
"force levels must be "within the context of international obligations 
which Ukraine has accepted." 
B. In wartime: mobilizing all material and human resources to repel 
aggression; defeating the aggressor, depriving him of the ability to 
prolong hostilities and bringing the war to a favorable conclusion. 
Measures that are listed in the doctrine, in order to attain military 
security, include: 
A. Political-diplomatic efforts to reduce levels of confrontation. 
B. The creation of zones free of weapons of mass destruction. 
C. The creation of regional security systems and collective action to 
resolve emerging conflicts. 
D. The maintenance of combat readiness and force levels and 
deployments sufficient to repulse aggression from "all-directions", 
together with a mass mobilization capability. 
E. The willingness to assign troops to the UN to halt aggression and 
support peace "in different regions." 
The military-technical aspects section of the doctrine stresses that the 
Armed Forces be prepared and be able to resist aggression. It asserts that 
priority will go to the development of precision weaponry, reconnaissance 
capabilities, air-space defense, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, missile 
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forces and aviation, air-mobile units and "future oriented ocean-going ships and 
submarines." This section also mentions that the UAF be given a unified 
system of automated command and control, intelligence gathering and fire 
control. It states that training will be for both defensive and offensive 
operations to ensure that the initiative can be seized and retained. Finally, it 
stated that during war, the Border and Interior Troops, the National Guard, the 
Security Service and Civil Defense "will work with the Armed Forces." [Ref. 42] 
The müitary-economic section of the Doctrine mentions that the objective 
of müitary-economic policy is the creation of a reliable defense capability in the 
context of reasonable defense expenditure. The principles of military economic 
policy are as follows: 
A. The guarantee of maximum effectiveness in military production 
given financial and material constraints. This demands a competitive 
approach to development and production. 
B. The acquisition of high-technology systems with as much 
standardization as possible. 
C. The "rational" conversion of defense industries is mentioned. 
The müitary-economic section of the Doctrine further states, that 
scientific-technical priority must go to developing technologies with both 
military and civilian applications and to those in which Ukraine has, or can 
achieve, a global standard. The aim is to raise the fire power and mobüity and 
produce equipment competitive on the world market. Although high- 
technology is paramount to Ukraine's defense system, it claims that the first call 
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on financial resources should go to ensuring the material and social well-being 
of servicemen.  [Ref. 43] 
C.      ANALYSIS AND COMMENT OF UKRAINE'S MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Ukraine, like Russia, has been sluggish in developing and accepting a 
national defense policy, which has been called a "military doctrine." It was not 
until 19 October 1993, that a very terse and direct revised draft was made into 
law, formally declaring Ukrainian national security interests and policy. This 
new doctrine, resulting from the Declaration of Sovereignty of 1990 and the 
Declaration of Independence of 1991, clearly outlined the main tenets on 
preventing war, building the armed forces and preparation of the state and the 
armed forces in repelling aggression in any military-political situation. Its 
major characteristic was the defensive nature of Ukraine's security policy, 
based on the principles of nonintervention, respect for the integrity of national 
borders and national independence of other states, and rejection of the idea of 
using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. This strongly differs 
from the newly adopted Russian military doctrine, which foresees Russian 
military intervention across Russia's borders under certain conditions, such as 
interference in peripheral conflicts and protection and defense of the rights of 
Russian minorities in neighboring states (and first strike against any state allied 
to a nuclear state). This was seen by many analysts especially aimed at 
Ukraine.  [Ref. 44] 
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The military doctrine "is based on an analysis of the global geopolitical 
situation and a long-term, scientifically-based prognosis of its development. Its 
tenets are binding for the organs and organizations of the state, the 
administration and the citizens of Ukraine. The plan for the building of the 
Armed Forces ... is worked out on the basis of the military doctrine." [Ref. 45] 
Due to political sensitivity, Ukraine's new doctrine refrains from identifying 
precisely what the potential threats from neighboring states may actually be. 
Instead, it only defines the possible opponent of Ukraine as a "state whose 
consistent policy presents a military threat to Ukraine, leads to interference in 
the internal affairs of Ukraine or encroaches on its territorial integrity and its 
national interests." This description leaves little to the imagination as to where 
the threat could possibly originate. 
In order to strengthen the Ukrainian government's previous statutory and 
political commitment to a non-nuclear status, the doctrine states that "Ukraine 
intends to become non-nuclear in the future." However, it also positively 
asserts Ukraine's ownership of nuclear weapons inherited on its territory. The 
military doctrine emphasizes the fundamental law of "reasonable defense 
sufficiency" in regulating the size and types of forces and the quantity and 
quality of conventional weapons and systems. It focuses on developing a 
modern, well-trained, well-armed and highly mobile force, with a special 
emphasis on precision weapons, intelligence and electronic warf are capability, 
air and space defense and sufficient air and sea power.  To attain all this, it 
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calls for the development and maintenance of a modern and economically 
rational national defense industrial base.  [Ref. 46] 
The basis for the Military Doctrine was the "Basic Directions of Foreign 
Policy of Ukraine," adopted by the Parliament on 2 July 1993. It is stressed by 
many analysts that the Military Doctrine (Appendix C - The Military Doctrine 
of Ukraine) as a 'second level' document should be more detailed than it is at 
present. To fully comprehend the Ukrainian military, it is crucial to analyze 
three aspects of this doctrine: the military and political, the military and 
technical, and the military and economical. 
1.        Military Political Aspects of Doctrine 
Presently, one of the key dilemmas in the political-military sphere is that 
Ukraine itself still has not determined its political priorities. Based on the 
present political realities, Ukraine has three courses of action it can select to 
make the Military Doctrine a guide for other countries to build their relations 
with Ukraine on stable legal basis: 
• Non-aligned status of Ukraine (according to the Military Doctrine of 
Ukraine) 
• Joining European structures, and 
• Rapprochement with CIS countries and joining the CIS Military 
Union. 
Unfortunately, the statements of Ukrainian politicians force analysts to 
make a conclusion that they have no common foreign policy concept, although 
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a document such as the "Basic Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine" already 
exists (Appendix D - Attitude of Ukrainian Leaders towards the Doctrine). This 
was evident when the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, said he did not 
understand non-block statutes of Ukraine, and when the Ukrainian Foreign 
Minister considered that effective European security could not exist in a divided 
Europe. In other speeches, Deputy Foreign Minister B. Tarasiuk held the same 
view, but also estimated that the role of Ukraine in peaceful settlement of 
international conflicts would be only on the territory of the CSCE. This lack of 
coordination and synchronization between the political leaders negatively 
affects the implementation of Ukraine's military doctrine.  [Ref. 47] 
Although some talks have been conducted between Ukraine and Russia 
(Appendix E - Ukraine and Russia), Russia continues to delay signing a general 
political treaty in which it would confirm the territorial integrity and state 
borders of both countries. In addition, the problem is compounded if one takes 
into account the unpredictability of the present Government of Russia, as well 
as its possible successor. This reality clearly depicts how objectionable, and 
even dangerous, a military union can be with Russia or the CIS if Russia's role 
would be dominant (Appendix F - Ukraine and the CIS). 
The urgency of Ukraine's "non-bloc" status was presumably initially 
intended to mollify Russian concerns. Reality is that, Ukraine has joined 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) two years before Russia, and during President 
Clinton's recent visit to Ukraine, Kuchma has voiced his desire in the extension 
NATO. Although this is a positive move for Ukraine, it is contrary to what was 
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initially intended when the military doctrine was written. It seems that the 
doctrine has been superseded by additional agreements since the creation of 
the document. While many aspects have changed since 1993, others still 
remain relevant. 
Ukraine will continue to integrate with the European and international 
community by seeking to join international organizations and diversify its 
foreign trade. Organizations which Ukraine seeks to join include the Council 
of Europe, GATT, EU and the Central European Initiative. Ukraine will also 
strive to deepen its participation in structures where it is an existing member, 
such as NACC and NATO's Partnership for Peace. 
2.       Military-Technical Aspects of Doctrine 
The only sort of conflict currently envisioned for the armed forces seems 
to be of the large-scale conventional type. The doctrine emphasizes the need 
to supply world-class weaponry (particularly precision strike, air, air defense 
and missile systems, electronic warfare, air-mobile units and an ocean-going 
navy). Ample redeployments are depicted in order to "organize an effective 
defense in all directions." Presently, for historical purposes, the sites of military 
bases and formations are directed to the execution of theater strategic offensive 
operations against NATO, while the Russian border is substantially bare. The 
doctrine calls for the possession of mass mobilization capability, emphasizing 
restraint or aversion to an invasion to affirm national independence in the sight 
of a perceived hostile Russia. 
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Security is not sought simply through the fielding of substantial armed 
forces. The doctrine emphasizes that political-diplomatic endeavors will be 
made to defuse potentially volatile situations and decrease confrontation. 
Indeed, the doctrine demands resolving all interstate disagreements by political 
means: all states, it implores, should strive to repudiate the use of force and 
respect others' national interests. This, of course, assumes that a potential 
enemy will honor the same rules and believe that it requires "two to negotiate." 
There is an implied misgiving in the doctrine, however, that Russia, will not. 
Some work will also go into establishing regional security systems. Though not 
explicitly, but through suggestion, these will have anti-Russianism as their 
uniting theme. 
The readiness to appoint servicemen to the UN to "halt aggression...and 
support peace and security in different regions" may be attributed to a variety 
of reasons. Such acts will boost Ukraine's status in the global arena, and the 
country should, after all, strive to be an "influential power." They will also 
suggest to others that Ukraine is a reliable member of the European society of 
nations, to which a certain obligation is owned. Finally, they may incorporate 
some troops from a presently oversized army that cannot be readily decreased 
due to a fear of producing dissatisfaction from the public. 
When creating personnel policy, the doctrine strives for an all- 
professional armed forces. Theoretically, these would be of a greater 
dependability during a crisis with Russia. In the meantime, however, cost 
considerations as well as the prejudices of a traditionally inclined, former 
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Soviet military leadership, prevent a departure from conscription. This Soviet 
mindframe is evident in the call for "military-patriotic education for 
preconscription and conscripted youth and all personnel." The will to resurrect 
a Soviet styled educational system and to incorporate military personnel in 
school and university curriculum, is most likely implied both here and in the 
remark that the armed forces educational framework is a significant sector of 
the state educational system. Not surprisingly, due to the dismaying conditions 
endured by many servicemen, the resolution of "questions relating to social 
protection" is deemed worthy in including as a principle. If the army is to be 
dependable, this surely merits the "first call on financial resources" that is in the 
military-economic sector. The elimination of political party influence in the 
armed forces may be reasonable but unpopular with many officers, particularly 
with those in the Union of Ukrainian Officers who became accustomed to 
exercising political authority. It must therefore be questioned whether a 
government decree could possibly cushion the army from possible political 
conflicts.  [Ref. 48] 
According to the Military Doctrine, the Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces 
in Europe (Appendix G - Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe) and the 
statement on numerical staff of Ukrainian Army approved by the Parliament 
Ukraine is required to reduce its army in all directions. One of the most critical 
considerations that requires full acknowledgement by the Parliament, is that a 
reduction of the army without determined tasks and coordinated activity of all 
its structures (with top priority given to staff and military equipment structures) 
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may lead to the loss of its fighting capability. Presently, President Kuchma 
considers that the essence of military reforms should be changed. However, 
reforming requires that a certain concept of reforms exist; a concept which 
Ukraine does not possess to this point (neither legally, nor in fact). Kuchma's 
comments to Holos Ukrainy on 13 October 1994, are closer to reality, when he 
stated that although reforms are possible, it is very likely that Ukraine would 
not be able to manage its own industrial and military potential. The problem 
of carrying out well-grounded military reform is complicated by the fact that 
armaments are scheduled to be reduced by November 1995 (according to the 
Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe). The present pace of armament 
reductions shows that Ukraine may not be able to implement the Treaty. [Ref. 
49] 
3.        Military-Economic Aspects of Doctrine 
The doctrine realizes the limits which (currently disastrous) economic 
situations impose on defense spending. It therefore demands a greater 
competency in the use of resources assigned to defense, for example, a 
requirement for competitive approach to acquisition. It seems that the military 
and defense industries, collectively a prevailing political force, have been losing 
power, and are now more under control of the Minister of Defense and the 
Parliament. Although, the undertone of the miktary-technical and military- 
economic sections of the Ukrainian doctrine repeat that of the Russians: a terse 
admission that finances are strained, succeeded by a shopping list redolent of 
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the Soviet-era spending sprees, reality is showing that under Kuchma's 
leadership, Ukraine is attempting to balance overall national economic needs 
with those of its military. This shows that the content of the military doctrine 
is not reflecting the reality of Ukraine's actions. Recently some changes have 
been instituted as a result of Kuchma's and Shmarov's incentives. The concept 
of saving money by means of applying competitive principles and contracts is 
becoming more prevalent not only with the defense suppliers but also in the 
civilian sector.  [Ref. 50] 
According to, Economy of Ukraine (No. 5, 1994) Ukraine produced 17 
percent of the USSR's Gross Product and supplied approximately 23 percent of 
military products of the former Soviet Union, during the 1980's. Comparison 
of military equipment of the troops dislocated on Ukrainian territory and the 
share of this territory in the USSR leads to two conclusions: (1) the potential 
of the Ukrainian Military Industrial Complex exceeded its possible 
consumption; and (2) among former USSR republics, Ukraine was the most 
militarized. 
According to the first variant of the State Budget expenses, the Defense 
Ministry constituted 21,976,000 million karbovantsi (ferb);later, according to the 
alterations made in the budget on 19 November 1994, these expenses were 
reduced to 1,000,000 million krb. However, it is important to mention that the 
Defense Ministry expenses on the purchase of armaments are overstated, since 
most military products of most MIC (military industrial complex) enterprises 
are not unprofitable, since production is financed by the State Budget according 
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to expenditures.   The primary reasons for the cost of production growth 
include: 
• proscription to entering commodity markets 
• serial production drop 
• 'naturalization' of production 
• increase in investments needed 
• absence of 'normal' organization of production 
• rise of prices for parts and details 
Despite of the sharp drop in production, unsold products constituted 11.5 
trillion krb.  [Ref. 51] 
At first glance, the Ukrainian defense industrial complex is a massive 
entity that should have no problem becoming self-sufficient [Ref. 52]. The 
Ukrainian defense industrial complex comprises some 700 plants employing 
over 1 million workers. In addition about 17 percent of former Soviet defense 
production enterprises and about 11 percent of former Soviet defense scientific- 
research institutes are located in Ukraine [Ref. 53]. 
Although impressive, these figures are somewhat misleading. Russia 
clearly dominated the defense industrial sector of the former Soviet Union, 
accounting for 82 percent of the defense industrial complex [Ref. 54]. All of the 
top ten defense industrial cities in the former Soviet Union are in Russia [Ref. 
55]. 
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More important, the Ukrainian defense industrial sector at this point is 
not viable on its own. The Soviet planning system was highly interdependent, 
with all industrial organizations linked to the center. As a result, 70 percent of 
the Ukrainian economy is tied to Russia [Ref. 56]. Ukrainian President Kuchma 
has stated, 70-80 percent of Ukrainian industry works for Russia [Ref. 57]. A 
Kharkiv factory links with nearly 170 enterprises in Russia [Ref. 58]. Although 
Ukraine has a sizeable defense industrial complex, there are multiple gaps in 
its production. For example, Ukraine does not produce machine guns, semi- 
automatic rifles or pistols [Ref. 59]. It produces tanks but not tank guns [Ref. 
60]. Finally, regardless of what they historically produced, Ukrainian defense 
industrialists are faced with a dramatic decline in demand. In 1993, defense 
production dropped by 65 percent compared to 1991. Defense industries are 
reportedly working at 20 percent capacity, often working only 2-3 days a week 
[Ref. 61]. 
The dilemma for the Ukrainians is whether they should maintain a 
defense industrial base integrated with Russia, a potential enemy, or try to 
create autonomous defense capabilities. Given their lack of capital and their 
interdependence with Russian defense enterprises, a quick drive for autocracy 
seems implausible, whatever Ukraine's long-term security concerns. [Ref. 62] 
The last requirement assumes the Ukraine would enter the armaments 
markets which are occupied by Western countries, primarily the United States. 
Here Ukraine may use the experience of Israel, which modifies Soviet military 
equipment making it compatible with Western standards.    Ukraine has a 
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powerful remount potential which could help it to adopt Israel's experience in 
this field. Unfortunately, the military industrial complex (MIC) of Russia, on 
which many Ukrainian enterprises still depend, are not only unstable but have 
reduced chaotically. This has negatively effected the Ukrainian MIC progress. 
Even worse is the fact that Ukraine still has no program of military equipment 
sales. In 1994 it planned to sell military equipment for 23,510 million krb. and 
according to alterations to the Budget on 19 November 1994 this sum was 
reduced nearly 35 times.  [Ref. 63] 
4.        Present and Future Implications of the Military Doctrine 
All the three aspects, especially the first one, have no temporal 
characteristic (i.e., it is unclear whether today's realities or tasks for the future 
are meant). For example, one of the Doctrine's statements says: "Ukraine is 
against the presence of foreign troops on its territory..." yet Ukraine not only 
has foreign troops on its territory, but does not yet know when it will be able 
to get rid of them. Also, a spatial characteristic is absent in the Doctrine (i.e., 
priorities and forms of military co-operation with other countries are not 
determined). Another paradox of the Doctrine is the absence of general 
concept of military reforms. Following the territorial division of the former 
Soviet Army, Ukraine needs to introduce changes concerning such important 
aspects as tasks, organizational and management principles, and structure. The 
concept of military reforms should reflect the tasks of Ukrainian Armed Forces 
creation in which military operations are directed at:   local, regional, small 
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armed conflicts. Only after taking these factors into account can the Parliament 
and the Ministry of Defense decide what kind of army Ukraine needs. If and 
when these determinations are made they should become the heart of military 
reform. 
With all the problems that exist with the Doctrine, it is possible to state 
that it is not a document which allows policy makers to determine the main 
directions of Ukrainian military policy. Weak points of the Doctrine may be 
illustrated by the attitude of both politicians and servicemen towards it. In spite 
of the fact that radical changes in any field of activity (including the military 
one) is still quite possible in Ukraine and very often depends on the changes 
in the government, the true reason for ignoring the Doctrine is the absence of 
determination of existing realities, temporal and spatial characteristics and 
concept of military reform in it. 
According to many researchers, the Military Doctrine should be 
completely reworked on the basis of the developed military concept and should 
be approved by the VR. Unfortunately, according to, Intelnews, Ukraine's 
leading English-language news agency, Ukraine's Defense Minister, Valeriy 
Shmarov, stated in 1994 that he would not spur any major changes in Ukraine's 
defense policy. "Currently there is no need to introduce any corrections to 
Ukraine's military doctrine," Shmarov said on 28 August 1994. "The West need 
not worry about these changes. Ukraine's policies will not alter," said 
Volodymyr Mukhin, Parliament Defense and National Security Commission 
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chairman. "Appointment of a civilian as a defense minister shows that we are 
moving to a European standard." [Ref. 64] 
At the same time, there are certain doubts that new doctrine could pass 
the Permanent Committee of the Verkhovna Rada on the questions of defense 
and state security. First, because of the low professional level of its members, 
and second, because of political sympathies of the majority of members of the 
Committee where the 'pro-Russia wing' has ten members (not counting so called 
non-party members). Overall, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, in spite of its 
validity, does not reflect existing realities of the developing world and European 
situation. In connection with this fact, Ukrainian leaders either ignore the 
Doctrine or do not agree with its statements. This in its turn does not allow 
Ukraine to create stable and legal relations with other countries. 
Although the Military Doctrine of Ukraine needs to be reworked, the 
requirements that Kiev perceives for the UAF have become clear within the 
comparatively brief space of three years. Ukraine must be able to protect its 
northern and eastern borders in order to deter aggression from what many in 
Kiev still see as the possibility of a resurgent imperialist government to the 
north, since it cannot guarantee for itself the continuation of the peaceful, 
democratic process throughout the former Soviet Union. Ukraine must be able 
to protect its shipping and ports in the Black Sea area, and must be able to 
maintain internal control during the deepening economic crisis. In addition, it 
must also be able to respond, as it has done in the former Yugoslavia for the 
last two years, to the need for peacekeeping in the region, and it must be able 
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to integrate with its allies and partners in both the CIS and NATO to that end 
[Ref. 65]. To insure that all these requirements are met, it is crucial that a 
potent and credible force structure and levels exist within the UAF. 
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IV. FORCE STRUCTURE AND LEVELS 
Although initial estimates of the size of armed forces located on the 
territory of Ukraine following the demise of the Soviet Union varied, it was not 
until January 1992 that a more realistic accounting was obtained, namely 
726,000. It was generally agreed that a force of this size had to be reduced: 
Ukraine needed a smaller force for its defense and one that it could afford. 
[Ref. 66] 
On 19 October 1993, the Ukrainian Supreme Council finally approved the 
end strength for the Ukrainian armed forces at 450,000 personnel. The main 
components of the military reform concept call for reorganizing military 
administration and command, redeploying the forces to adapt them to the new 
military and geographical reality and reducing the force structure manpower 
and equipment to meet two primary criteria - the principle of "reasonable 
defense sufficiency" and the ceilings established by the Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1992.  [Ref. 67] 
The original "Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe" (CFE) was signed 
by the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on 19 November 1990, 
almost one year prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the 
12 republics (less the three Baltic states) issued a joint declaration in Tashkent 
(15 May 1992) in which they, as successor states to the Soviet Union, agreed 
to apportion among themselves the Treaty of Limited Equipment, originally 
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allotted to the former Soviet Union. On 10 July 1992, a Concluding Act on the 
limitation of personnel strengths was signed in Helsinki (based on a previous 
Vienna agreement) by NATO members, former members of the Warsaw Pact 
and seven republics of the former Soviet Union having forces located in the 
Atlantic to the Urals region. The CFE ceilings for Ukraine, to be implemented 
by the end of 1995, are as follows (figures in parentheses show current declared 
strengths): 
• Armed Forces: 450,000 (726,000) 
• Tanks: 4,080  (6,300) 
• Armored Combat Vehicles: 5,050 (6,170) 
• Artillery: 4,040 (3,080) 
• Aircraft:  1,090 (1,380) 
• Combat Helicopters: 330 (240) 
The actual progress for meeting these figures, is however proceeding 
slowly and therefore will continue into 1996 and thereafter.  [Ref. 68] 
In the summer of 1992, three former Soviet military districts - 
Transcarpathian, Odessa and Kiev - were formally abolished and replaced with 
the Western and Southern Operational commands and Central Command 
centered in Kiev. As the restructuring proceeded, the ground operational forces 
were being gradually reassigned to the two operational commands, while other 
operational    (large   combat   support   and   service   support   units)    and 
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non-operational elements (such as military school systems and training bases) 
are being subordinated to the central command. 
This restructuring created two Strategic Groupings: a Western region 
(former Carpathian Military District), and a Southern region (former Odessa 
Military District). The Kiev Military District was abolished and its assets were 
used to create "a central administration." Presumably, again for reasons of 
political sensitivity, no operational command was established in eastern 
Ukraine, facing Russia, although near the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994, 
some restructured operational forces were deployed to eastern regions. [Ref. 
69] 
It could be argued that the problems of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 
the first three years of existence stemmed from two main sources: the failure 
to estimate correctly the effort and cost involved in reforming the armed forces; 
and a disagreement regarding what "reasonable defense sufficiency" meant in 
terms of technology and strength of the armed forces. To best understand the 
force levels and structure of the UAF it is crucial to review the specifics as they 
apply to the Main General Staff of the UAF and each of the three service 
branches. 
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A.       THE MAIN (GENERAL) STAFF OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED 
FORCES 
As was the case in the former Soviet Armed Forces, the evolution of the 
UAF and the degree of excellence and combat effectiveness to which they 
aspire, will depend on the experience, intellectual capacity, and administrative 
ability of the Chief of the Main Staff and his senior assistants. Since January 
1992 there have been a number of changes at the top, reflecting a mood of 
uncertainty v/ithin the Ukrainian High Command stemming in part from 
political pressure. 
While the Ukrainians initially eschewed the designation "General," the 
Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is modeled for the most part on its 
Soviet/Russian counterpart (Appendix H - Supreme Command). The nucleus 
comprises a Main Operations Directorate, a Main Organization-Mobilization 
Directorate, a Communication Directorate, a Military Intelligence Directorate, 
and a Directorate of Personnel. The Ukrainian Main Staff, however, also 
contains the following Directorates: Missile Troops and Artillery; Air Force and 
Air Defense; Armaments; Engineering Troops; Education and Training Branch, 
Chemical Defense, and the Inspectorate of Training. 
Aside from the minor structural changes in the Main General Staff, the 
ethnic composition of this staff is still unequally distributed. The majority of 
senior officers now serving in the Main Staff and other branches of the Defense 
Ministry are graduates of the Moscow General Staff Academy of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. While Ukraine is seeking alternative outlets, it is likely that the 
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General Staff Academy will continue to receive Ukrainian promising officers 
based on a bilateral agreement between the two countries. At the time of the 
declaration of Ukrainian independence there were about 20 Ukrainian officers 
either at the Academy, or scheduled to be enrolled. As of 1995, the majority of 
officers in the General Staff, still continue to be of Russian dissent. More 
specifics on the ethnic imbalance in the General Staff is addressed in Chapter 
VI (Ethno-security Map).  [Ref. 70] 
B.       THE UKRAINIAN ARMY 
In terms of force structure, Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union the 
following ground forces: five armies, one army corps, 18 divisions (twelve 
motorized, four tank and two airborne), three airborne brigades, three artillery 
divisions and a host of combat support and combat service support units. The 
reform concept calls for abandoning the army structure and reconfiguring these 
forces by 1995 into three army corps, seven motorized rifle divisions, two tank 
divisions, seven motorized rifle divisions, two tank divisions, five motorized rifle 
brigades, two tank brigades and two airmobile brigades (restructured from 
former airborne divisions), nine artillery brigades, four antiaircraft brigades, 
three combat engineer brigades, three chemical protection brigades and three 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades. The motorized rifle divisions and 
brigades will be converted into mechanized units. The ground army is in the 
process of being reduced from its 1992 strength of 245,000 to 180,000 by 1995. 
This three-year reform will result in an Interim Force - "the army of 1995." This 
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reform program is slated to be streamlined further by 1999, with the objective 
of developing a base force - "the army of 2000" - a ground army of 95,000 
consisting of the following operational maneuver units: five mechanized 
infantry divisions, one tank division, seven mechanized infantry brigades, three 
tank brigades, two airmobile brigades and an appropriate mix of combat 
support and combat service support elements.  [Ref. 71] 
In April/May 1994 the first phase of restructuring the present 
army/division order of battle to a corps/brigade level of operations was initiated. 
This transformation is expected to occur by the end of 1995, although the more 
realistic end product will most likely result in 1996. In addition to the 
restructuring process, numerous formations will be disbanded in the course of 
the projected reduction of force levels in Ukraine. The elite 24th Motor Rifle 
Division (Lvov) will probably be retained, while the bulk of the 98th Airborne 
Division, which was taken over by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry in June 
1992, will form part of the planned Ukrainian "rapid reaction" mobile force, 
together with the spetsnaz brigade.  [Ref. 72] 
C.       THE UKRAINIAN AIR FORCE 
Ukraine inherited from the former Soviet Union assets that make the 
Ukrainian air force the third largest in the world. Its inventory includes long- 
range bombers, transport planes, strike aircraft, reconnaissance and electronic 
warfare planes, a large contingent of tactical and air defense fighters and 
training aircraft. The former four air armies are being restructured into three 
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aviation groups and one naval aviation group. Air force personnel will be cut 
from its 1992 strength of 86,000 to 25,000 by 1999, while the inventory of 1,380 
combat planes will be reduced to 1,090 in 1995 and to 590 by 1999. The air 
defense contingent is being reshaped from one air defense army and three 
corps into three air defense corps, and its strength will be reduced from its 
present 67,000 to 26,000 personnel. The air defense forces, previously an 
independent branch, were subordinated under the Ukrainian air force as a 
subcommand. [Ref. 73] There has always been little cooperation between 
these two organizations but their combination is the only major reallocation of 
role and resources to have taken place outside the other service branches. The 
disposition of troops between the Military Districts, to include the command 
structure after the creation of the MOD and the Ukrainian General Staff, has 
remained mostly as it was at the time of Ukraine's declaration of independence. 
D.       THE UKRAINIAN NAVY 
The status of the third arm of the Ukrainian armed forces, the navy, is 
still in temporary abeyance; it currently constitutes the weakest link in the 
Ukrainian defense system. Naval reform is more problematic as the status of 
the Black Sea Fleet, from which the Ukrainian naval force is to evolve, has 
become mired in a tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine over the issue of 
how to divide the naval assets. Despite at least six attempts to resolve the fate 
of the Black Sea Fleet, it is not clear if a workable final solution will be signed 
by President Kuchma and Yeltsin. This is because the main issue is not the 
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fleet itself, which consists of outdated and strategically unimportant vessels, but 
the naval bases and infrastructure in Southern Ukraine and the Crimea. 
Recognition of Ukraine's borders by Russia in an interstate treaty which 
included Crimea, would help to resolve the Black Sea Fleet question. The 
Ukrainian side has consistently complained, however, that despite the election 
of a more accommodating Ukrainian president Russia's negotiating demands 
have remained intractable. "All of the old Russian attitudes are preserved in the 
new proposals," Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyi, Ukraine's naval chief 
complained. [Ref. 74] Russian demands for a 99-year exclusive lease on 
Sevastopol have been rejected by Kiev in favor of leases for five- to ten-year 
periods during which Sevastopol would be used by both the Ukrainian and 
Russian Fleets. In a meeting at Yalta on 3 August 1992, Russia's President 
Boris Yeltsin and Ukraine's President Kravchuk agreed in principle, although 
not in actual specific numbers and categories of vessels, to divide the fleet and 
had thereby seemingly defused a potentially explosive situation by postponing 
the final resolution of this issue until the summer of 1995. Since then, a 
bilateral Russian and Ukrainian working commission drafted an agreement on 
the apportionment of fleet assets. This formula has not worked because, in 
practice, the whole fleet was being gradually and unilaterally converted into a 
national "Russian fleet," aggravating the already serious friction between 
Ukraine and Russia. At a subsequent meeting in Massandra, Crimea, on 3 
September 1993, the Russian delegation headed by Yeltsin reportedly cajoled 
Ukraine's Kravchuk into signing a protocol, whereby Ukraine would "sell" part 
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or most of its share of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia as a repayment of its 
outstanding hard currency debt. The current Black Sea Fleet consists of 
approximately 645 mostly aging ships and 72,000 men. [Ref. 75] As the 
unresolved crisis continues, the nucleus of an independent Ukrainian navy is 
being formed, consisting primarily of ships newly built in Ukrainian shipyards, 
placed under Ukrainian naval administrative and operational command and 
manned by personnel who have sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian state. The 
formation of a small marine force contingent and a naval aviation unit has 
begun. The Ukrainian government has also taken control over much of the 
naval shore-based facilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine has the necessary 
shipbuilding capability but, for the near future, may not be able to allocate the 
necessary resources that are needed elsewhere.  [Ref. 76] 
One of the key structural changes to the armed forces have been to the 
navy, whose fleet of six vessels is a far cry from the vast commitment of the 
Black Sea Fleet. Although some analysts may disagree, the Black Sea Fleet 
issue itself seems closer than ever to resolution. Recent talks in Moscow have 
produced some progress and it is possible that there is an end to the dispute in 
sight. In the meantime, the Black Sea Fleet represents for Ukraine a vast drain 
on financial, military and diplomatic resources for no tactical or strategic 
advantage. [Ref. 77] Although many details have yet to be worked out, in June 
1995 President Yeltsin and Kuchma signed an accord, in Sochi, on dividing the 
Black Sea Fleet. Its provisions dictate the Russia will receive 82 percent of the 
fleet's vessels, while Ukraine will receive 18 percent.  It also states that the 
57 
property will be split 50/50, and that the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the 
Ukrainian Navy will have separate bases, allowing the Russians to be 
temporarily headquartered in Sevastopol. This agreement further established 
that: 
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy will have 
separate bases. 
• The fleet's main base and Headquarters will be located in the city of 
Sevastopol. 
• The Black Sea Fleet will have use of fleet facilities in the city of 
Sevastopol and of other basing and deployment sites for ships, aircraft 
and coast-guard forces and operational, combat, technical and rear- 
service facilities in Crimea. 
• Russia will take part in the social and economic development of 
Sevastopol and other communities where the Black Sea Fleet will be 
based. 
• A joint commission consisting of the Russian and Ukrainian state 
delegations to the talks on the Black Sea Fleet will be created to 
monitor implementation of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. 
The commission will be charged with working out the specific 
parameters of the division of Black Sea Fleet facilities. 
At this time, a very delicate situation is developing with regard to the 
Fleet. On the one hand, a "breakthrough" agreement seems to have been 
reached that resolves many previous disputes. On the other hand, the 
agreement is written in vague language (the result of compromise), and that 
vague phrasing is giving rise to differing interpretations.  [Ref. 78] 
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E.        PARA-MILITARY FORCES 
As inmost post-Soviet successor states, including Russia, more resources 
have been diverted towards specialist internal security units because of the 
perception of the country's leaders that domestic threats are more dangerous 
than external invasions, which are unlikely, at least in the short term. In 
Ukraine, the National Guard will be increased to 50,000 troops. Its function is 
to act in the same paramilitary role as the French CRS or Italian Carabinieri. 
They support the militia in times of domestic disturbances, such as in the 
Crimea, or the Border Troops in the event of border disputes. The Border 
Troops number between 15,000 and 20,000 and now patrol all of Ukraine's 
borders. They were introduced on the Russian-Ukrainian border in January 
1993 (in other areas Border Troops were deployed before 1991 on the former 
frontier of the Soviet Union). 
The State Protection Service, formerly under the Soviet KGB, now has 
the task of protecting the president, parliament and government. The Security 
Service of Ukraine, the successor to the KGB, continues to combine both 
external and internal intelligence gathering, as well as counterintelligence 
work. The Ministry of Internal Affairs now has large speciahst forces under its 
command, geared to deal with domestic disturbances. The former Soviet riot 
police (OMON) were restructured as the Berkut (Golden Eagles) riot police. 
These are mainly professionals who have served previously in parachute, 
marine or National Guard units as conscripts. In addition to these, the Ministry 
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of Internal Affairs continues to control large numbers of Internal Troops whose 
duties are the same as in the Soviet times - guarding communications and 
prisons. The State Automobile Inspectorate (DAT) also continues to function 
as an armed unit.  [Ref. 79] 
F.       PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE:  1992-2000 
Immediately after the declaration of independence of 24 August 1991, 
senior officials, Deputies of the Supreme Soviet and figures across the radical 
political spectrum, welcomed the decision to confiscate former Soviet military 
assets on Ukrainian soil and established national armed forces. In most cases, 
however, estimates of the size, role, and structure of the future Ukrainian army 
were wide of the mark, and were dictated above all by emotion. While most 
commentators spoke of a "nuclear-free" Ukraine, with regard to the size of the 
armed forces some envisaged a total of "half a million" men. This emotional 
program was soon revised, and in early October the new Defense Minister 
Morozov had reduced the figure to "around 300,000." Some months were to 
pass before Morozov put forward a clear program for the period 1992-2000. 
The initial eight-year period for creation of the Ukrainian armed forces 
was divided into four stages. Stage one, 1992-1993, was to be devoted to the 
establishment of central organs of command and control: Defense Ministry; 
Main Staff; and the basic infrastructure of the arms of service. The second 
stage, 1993-1994, would see the elaboration of a military doctrine, governing 
the structure and role of the arms of service (Appendix I - Troop Strength 
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COOO)). During stage three, 1995-1997, the basis would be laid for structuring 
a system of mobile forces, with a reliable reserve. At the same time, the 1992 
level of 657,000 officers and men would be cut by 1997 to around 400,000. 
Finally, between 1997 and the year 2000, overall force levels would be reduced 
to around 200,000.  [Ref. 80] 
With regard to the crucial first stage of the development of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces, by early 1993 the basic infrastructure was in place. With a few 
notable exceptions, the "personnel problem" had been temporarily solved with 
former Soviet officers, Russians and Ukrainians assigned to the key posts. 
Irrelevant of how Ukrainians felt about Russians in critical decision making 
roles, they possessed more military expertise than the Ukrainians did. This was 
primarily due to the "ethnic security map" that existed in the days of the Soviet 
Union, which allowed the Russians, who held the upper hand, to maintain 
experience. The second phase, which has required a further elaboration of the 
military doctrine, has only partially been worked out. The Military Doctrine of 
Ukraine continues to remain a very vague document, lacking sufficient 
guidance for the military leadership and policy makers. According to current 
Defense Minister Shmarov, as of 28 August 1994, no changes in the Military 
Doctrine were required. It seems that the initial eight-year plan for the creation 
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has bogged down in politics and progress for 
stages two, three and four will be most likely be more difficult than initially 
thought. 
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A Ukrainian serviceman today would notice little difference from the 
service his predecessors experienced in the Soviet army of 1989-1990. Soldiers 
are garrisoned in the same places, receive the same equipment and, when there 
is fuel and ammunition available, receive the same training. Despite the high- 
level administrative reorganization and the complicating factor of political 
disagreements in the armed forces, for the majority of military units in Ukraine, 
it is still very much business as usual. The real issue of military reform which 
is yet to be completed is in the organization of a command and control 
structure subject to Kiev and reflecting a concept of defense which truly shapes 
the armed forces into a cohesive force reflecting the needs of the state. This 
process will take some time.  [Ref. 81] 
Ukraine has reduced the number of men under arms by at least 200,000 
over the last three years. Current estimates put the number of servicemen at 
approximately 450,000 (Appendix J - Ukraine's Military Balance: 1994-1995). 
The country's Defense Doctrine sets a target of 250,000, and few Ukrainian 
servicemen or politicians now contest this figure. The eventual aim is to 
establish a professional armed services. 
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V.  STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE 
UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES 
To best understand the strategic and operational factors (force levels, 
structure, potential application, and education) impacting the UAF, it is crucial 
to briefly present a net assessment of Ukraine's nuclear status, Ukraine's 
current military defense strategy options, the restructured military education 
system that will frame the future forces, and finally, the latest base force figures 
(1995) compared to the initial declared strengths in 1992. 
A.       NUCLEAR STATUS 
By all accounts, Ukraine immediately after its independence, by default, 
was the third largest nuclear power in the world, having inherited from the 
former Soviet Union 176 land-based nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBM's) with 1,240 nuclear warheads, plus 41 strategic nuclear bombers with 
an additional 460 warheads on bombs and cruise missiles. The Ukrainian 
government has vowed to make Ukraine a nuclear-free state once the nuclear 
weapons are disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Talks I (START I) Treaty, which is a precondition for 
ratification and implementation by the United States and Russia of a more 
radical nuclear disarmament agreement, START n. Ukrainian leaders have 
sensed that these nuclear weapons provide Ukraine with a formidable, albeit 
military deterrent capability, and they have evinced serious concerns about 
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Ukraine's security once these weapons are removed. After a long period of 
negotiations and resisting pressure from the West, the Ukrainian parliament 
finally ratified the START I treaty on 18 November 1993, but with ten 
substantive reservations. Key among these are demands for: 
• Security guarantees after Ukraine becomes non-nuclear. 
• Financial assistance to defray the cost of dismantling. 
• Compensation for the fissile material. 
The Supreme Council agreed to have 36 percent of Ukraine's 176 
strategic missiles and 42 percent of its warheads destroyed as soon as proper 
international financial and technical assistance is provided. As a result of 
further intensive negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the United States, 
and an apparent radical change of positions by the United States and Russia on 
the three key Ukrainian demands, a trilateral treaty was signed in Moscow on 
14 January 1994 by the Presidents of all three nations. The provisions of the 
treaty call for Ukraine to de-nuclearize itself within seven years. On 3 February 
1994, the Ukrainian parliament removed its reservations to START I, thereby, 
in effect, ratifying the treaty, yet at the same time it postponed its decision on 
joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [Ref. 82]. On 13 January 
1995, Ukraine's comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force. It covers all nuclear material 
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Ukraine, under its 
jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere (nuclear weapons still on 
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territory are excluded). Due to Ukraine's recent accession to the NPT, an NPT- 
type safeguards agreement will supersede the current one. Ad hoc IAEA 
inspections began in February 1995.  [Ref. 83] 
1.       Accelerated Transfer 
Prior to 1994, progress in transferring nuclear weapons to Russia 
progressed at an extremely slow pace. The key reason for Ukraine's hesitation 
in transferring nuclear weapons lay in the Ukrainian Parliament's doubts and 
suspicions of Russian intentions. After receiving "security assurances" from the 
Western powers and realizing that it does not have the capacity to endure the 
high costs for maintaining such an arsenal, Ukraine decided to accelerate the 
transfer of such technology to Russia. During the remainder of 1994, the pace 
of Ukrainian denuclearization accelerated as Ukraine exceeded the initial 
phases of the deactivation and transfer process outlined in the Trilateral 
Statement. The Statement specified that by mid-November 1994, all SS-24s on 
Ukrainian territory were to be deactivated. In fact, by early December 1994, 
not only had Ukraine deactivated all its SS-24s, but it had also deactivated 40 
out of its 130 SS-19s.  Second, the Trilateral Statement called for Ukraine to 
transfer at least 200 warheads from its SS-19s and SS-24s to Russia by mid 
November [Ref. 84].    Ukraine also exceeded this goal, transferring 360 
warheads by that date, and, as of February 1995, it had transferred a total of 
420 SS-24, SS-19, and heavy bomber warheads back to Russia [Ref. 85]. 
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On November 16, 1994, the Rada took the next step to confirm its 
denuclearization commitments, approving Ukraine's accession to the NPT. 
Once again, however, it imposed a condition, making Ukraine's accession 
contingent upon first receiving security guarantees by the nuclear states. 
2.       Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
At the Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), held in Budapest on December 5, 1994, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Russia provided security guarantees to Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus. France also provided security guarantees to Ukraine at the CSCE 
summit in a separate document. On the same occasion, Ukraine presented its 
instruments of accession to the NPT. This action, together with the earlier 
accessions by Belarus and Kazakhstan, satisfied Russia's conditions for 
exchanging the instruments of ratification for the START I Treaty. 
Consequently, at the same meeting, the United States, Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine exchanged their START I Treaty instruments of 
ratification, finally bringing the Treaty into force [Ref. 86]. 
3.        Nuclear Infrastructure 
Ukraine's civilian nuclear power program is comprised of five stations, 
each with a number of reactors either operating or under construction. 
(Appendix K - Ukraine and its Nuclear Resources) These stations are located 
at Pripyat/Chernobyl, Neteshin, Kuznetsovsk, Konstantinovsk, and Energodar. 
[Ref. 87] 
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There are no reprocessing or uranium enrichments plants in Ukraine that 
would give it the capability to produce weapons-usable plutonium or highly 
enriched uranium (HEU). However, the Kharkiv Physical-Technical Institute 
has in its possession up to 75 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade HEU in bulk 
form enriched up to 90 percent [Ref. 88]. Since this nuclear material is not yet 
under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, it could be of 
proliferation concern. 
Ukraine has inherited much of the Soviet missile production industrial 
base, which it plans to utilize for the manufacture of space-launch systems for 
export. However, this infrastructure also gives Ukraine the capability to 
produce or export ballistic missiles. Certain space equipment is already being 
produced at the Yuzhmash Plant, a former SS-18 major production facility at 
Dnipropetrovsk. Moreover, a former SS-24 production plant at Pavlograd, 
which believed to be in operation still, may be engaged in similar research and 
development activities [Ref. 89]. Presently Ukraine possesses 39 SS-19 ICBMs, 
580 ALCMs and Gravity Bombs, 578 long-range ALCMs, and two short-range 
ALCMs. Under the terms of the Trilateral Statement, all SS-24s have been 
deactivated. Many SS-24s may have been removed from their silos and the 
warheads are being transferred to Russia [Ref. 90] (Appendix L - Weapon 
Systems and Warheads in Ukraine). 
One of the primary concerns for Western countries is the control of 
nuclear material flowing out of the former Soviet republics. To enhance 
counter-prolif eration of such materials export controls have been emplaced, by 
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creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR). Ukraine is not a member and is not adhering to the 
NSG standards. It had sent an observer in March 1992 to the NSG meeting in 
Warsaw, and had requested similar observer status for the 1994 NSG meeting 
in Madrid, but was denied that status. In March 1995, Ukraine reaffirmed its 
intentions to become a member of the NSG and sent papers to the Secretariat 
of the IAEA to that effect. The IAEA invited Ukraine to attend the Helsinki 
meeting as observers. The Government is currently working to conform 
Ukraine's legislation with NSG guidelines [Ref. 91]. Since its independence, 
Ukraine has only formally approved two nuclear-related items for export. This 
licensed export occurred in 1993 and consisted of uranium ore and the rare- 
earth metal bismuth [Ref. 92]. In a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 
Washington on May 13,1994, Ukraine agreed to conduct its missile-and space- 
related exports according to the criteria and standards of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MCTR) [Ref. 93]. It is not, however, a formal 
member of the MCTR. 
4.        Command, Control and Communication (C3) 
Ukrainian authorities seem to have gained full control over the strategic 
forces troops whose sole mission is to protect and man the nuclear weapons 
sites in Ukraine. They are composed mainly of the 43rd Missile Army and 
related components with 40,000 to 50,000 men. In the fall of 1992, the 
Ukrainian government assumed unilateral administrative control over them on 
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the pretext that they are based on Ukrainian territory and that the Ukrainian 
government has since June 1992 been providing them with pay, subsistence and 
shelter. Having been thus removed from decisions concerning the manning, 
training and combat readiness of the strategic forces in Ukraine, the Supreme 
Command of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, a paper formation only, 
was dissolved on 15 June 1993, and the operational command (less command 
over the strategic forces) was assumed by the Russian General Staff. 
Apparently encouraged by these developments, the Ukrainian Supreme Council 
on 2 July 1993 declared full ownership of all nuclear assets on Ukrainian 
territory.  [Ref. 94] 
In the fall of 1992, the Ukrainian General Staff disconnected the lines of 
communicationbetween Moscow and major units in Ukraine, thereby assuming 
full command and control over these forces. Since then, it has been developing 
its own command, control and communication (C3) system for all major units 
on the Ukrainian territory except for the operational control of the strategic 
forces and that part of the Black Sea Fleet which is still under Russian and 
Ukrainian nominal dual control.  [Ref. 95] 
B.       UKRAINE'S IVULTTARY DEFENSE STRATEGY AND OPTIONS 
With the exception of de-nuclearization of its arsenal, for the last several 
years, Ukraine's attempt to reform its military has been extremely slow. 
Similarly, the development of specifics for a potential defense strategy on 
Ukraine's eastern border has also proceeded slowly. This is a crucial factor, 
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since, without such a plan, it is difficult to restructure the military force 
structure, levels, tasks and priorities. Although it seems that the specifics of 
such strategies have not yet been planned, an overall concept has been vaguely 
discussed at the highest levels of the Ministry of Defense and the Main General 
Staff. The defense concept includes three options: 
• forward defense 
• mobile defense 
• strategic defense in depth 
To best understand these three options, it is important to briefly discuss 
each and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. Due to limited 
open source in this arena, the basic concepts have been applied to the analysis 
of Dr. Barry Posen, Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology.  [Ref. 96] 
1.        Forward Defense 
This strategy would require the Ukrainian military to attempt to prevent 
Russian incursion into most of its territory, and would not require the direct 
defense of every inch of frontier, but even with the "wrinkles ironed out," the 
Russian border alone would comprise a 1000 kilometer (km) front. In this 
strategy, there would be no particular terrain features that could aid the 
defense. The weakness of this strategy is that Ukraine's fourteen-odd heavy 
divisions and five brigades would have a very difficult time covering this front. 
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Using the rule of thumb that a "medium sized/medium technology" armored or 
mechanized division which the UAF possess can control 25-35 kilometers (km) 
of the front on average terrain, with weaponry in sufficient density and depth 
to provide good prospects for a successful defense against a determined, well- 
armed, superior attacker, it is estimated, that only 60 percent of the front could 
be covered. This would leave the defense vulnerable to large scale flanking 
maneuvers or Ukraine could cover the whole front at one division per 60 
kilometer (km), with no reserves. This thin defense would be vulnerable to 
easy punctures followed by envelopments and then further exploitation. 
Forward defense is seductive to many Ukrainians, because of the high 
concentration of the Ukrainian industry that is located in the east, particularly 
in the Donetsk region. In addition roughly 40 percent of the Ukrainian 
population is situated in the eastern part of Ukraine. Ukrainians fear that once 
lost, these areas would unlikely be returned to Ukraine. From a military 
perspective, based on the current force structure, it seems that this strategy 
would end up in disaster.  [Ref. 97] 
2.        Mobile Defense 
This strategy would force Ukraine to gather its mechanized forces into 
several multi-divisional operational groupings (corps or armies), and attempt 
through a combination of better intelligence, superior tactical and operational 
proficiency, brilliant leadership, and high mobility, to "box" with roughly twice 
as many similar Russian groupings.  The purpose would be to maneuver for 
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advantage, and to fight only under conditions that would produce greatly 
favorable exchange rates. This would involve large scale "ambushes" of 
unsuspecting Russian formations on the move, slashing surprise flank attacks, 
and speedily executed and completed encirclement operations. Space would 
often be traded for time. These are very demanding operations. 
This strategy, unlike the previous one, would concede when necessary 
bloodless Russian occupation of the eastern areas of Ukraine, although it would 
focus on recovering these areas once Russian forces would be smashed in 
maneuver battles. The key problem with this strategy is that if the Russians 
adopt a limited aims strategy and do not go much beyond these zones, the 
mobile defense strategy would fail, and the Ukrainians would have to face a 
strong Russian force that posses quantitative superiority, technological parity, 
air superiority, and the advantages that normally accrue to a tactical defender. 
Aside from the Russian "limited-aims" offensive, there are no obvious reasons 
why Ukrainians should be able to outfight Russians in mobile warfare. In 
eastern Ukraine, the population - both Russian and indifferent Ukrainian - 
could, in many areas, prove more hostile to Ukrainian soldiers than to Russians. 
In addition, Ukrainians would be outnumbered by two-to-one, or worse. 
In the event Ukraine attempts a true mobile defense against any plausible 
Russian military strategy, limited aims or otherwise, all of the forgoing adds up 
to great probability that Ukrainian operational groupings would be surrounded, 
cut off from outside sources of supply, and annihilated.  [Ref. 98] 
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3.        Strategie Defense in Depth 
The last strategy that may be employed by Ukraine in defense from its 
Russian neighbor, is the "strategic defense in depth." Based on the present 
force levels and the political-economic reality that Ukraine presently is in, this 
strategy is the most plausible. This strategy would not attempt to hold all of 
Ukraine against all challenges, but it would create an array of probable costs 
and plausible risks to a future aggressor. If properly organized, Ukrainian 
forces would be able to fight a tough delaying action in the eastern half of the 
country. Ukrainian forces would then be able to offer a resilient defense of the 
other half of the country, west of the Dnipro River, against a very strong attack. 
A careful exploitation of the Pripet Marshes to the north and the Dnipro River 
should permit the Ukrainians to develop a plausible bastion that the Russians 
would have to pay a high price to attack. Therefore, these geographical 
barriers must be viewed as building blocks in a defensive system. Although 
such a plan would best suit the present UAF, it may also fail if Ukrainian forces 
cannot produce or import the fuel and munitions necessary for modern warfare. 
Although the Ukrainians might wish for something better than this, it will be 
very difficult for them to achieve a high-confidence conventional defense on 
most of their territory. 
Overall, it is important that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Main 
General Staff begin thinking of the specifics in these scenarios and decide upon 
a strategy, so that they may appropriately structure and reform their forces. 
Even more importantly, if the MOD is to make Ukraine's national security 
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credible, it is necessary to force the Russians to think twice about aggression 
of any kind. In order to achieve this, Ukrainian peacetime foreign policy, 
military strategy and force structure must be organized to convince a future 
Russian aggressor that the initial military costs of an attack on Ukraine will be 
high, and that there is meaningful risk or serious long term strategic costs. 
Thus, a Ukrainian strategy of conventional deterrence requires a resilient 
military that can resist intensively for a significant period of time.  [Ref. 99] 
C.       THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY SCHOOL SYSTEM 
Since August 1991, the disputes between Kiyv and Moscow over the fate 
of the strategic nuclear weapons and other "strategic assets" on Ukrainian soil 
and the Black Sea Fleet appear to have attracted most attention. Meanwhile, 
another change has been taking place which will possibly be of greater 
significance in the long term for the Ukrainian Armed Forces: the restructuring 
and reform of the former Soviet military educational system. 
In addition to gaining control of nuclear weapons, the Ukrainian defense 
establishment also inherited 34 military schools and military faculties at 78 
institutions of higher learning, far too many for its needs. The old educational 
system was bureaucratic and extremely redundant, making it too costly in the 
midst of economic hardship and required personnel cuts. A decision was made 
to streamline the educational structure in order to meet the "reasonable 
sufficiency" levels. The current plan calls for reorganizing the military 
education system as follows: 
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• Armed Forces Staff Academy (Kiyv) 
• Military University (Kharkiv) 
• Three joint military colleges 
• Five branches of service colleges 
• Forty-eight military faculties at institutions of higher learning 
• Nine military lyceums (mid-level schools) 
• Eleven müitary research centers (space and meteorological; C3 and 
electronic warfare; two air defense centers; precision weapons; air 
combat; naval operations; military medicine; müitary procurement and 
personnel staffing; humanities; and socio-psychological service). [Ref. 
100] 
All the former Soviet military schools have been uprooted, in many cases 
combining to form one institution; in some cases schools have been abolished 
altogether. In answer to calls from radical political groups, universities, and 
higher educational institutes, the number of Müitary Chairs (yiennaya kafedra) 
training students and reservists wül be reduced from 73 to 43. 
The 1992 Decree on the Ukrainian Müitary Education, Specialist and 
Reservist Training represented a fuU-blooded program of 'conversion.' It also 
introduced a number of novel concepts designed to bring müitary education in 
Ukraine into the twenty-first century. The most important and symbolic break 
with the former Soviet system was the introduction of the Müitary University 
(Voenniy Universitet) and Institute (Voenniy Institut), something between an 
Academy and Müitary School. The other significant innovation was the 
Müitary Lyceum (Voenniy Litsei), in most cases formed out of the assets of the 
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Military School (Voennoe uchilishche). The Military Lyceum, of which there 
were to be nine by September 1993 serving all four services and specialist 
support arms, did not, however, replace the former Soviet military school. The 
purpose of these Lyceums was to provide a qualitatively high standard of 
education for young candidates prior to entering a higher educational 
institution. In part, the changes reflect Western influence, and are a result of 
a study of the U.S., German, and French educational systems. In line with the 
change in nomenclature the curriculum, there will be a greater emphasis on the 
role of the 'humanities' in the education of cadets and mature students. [Ref. 
101] 
To best describe the Ukrainian military system it is crucial to briefly 
discuss the higher military education, senior military institutes, ground defence 
forces, air force, and the naval educational system, the specialists' military 
education, and security and intelligence services education. 
1.       Higher Military Education 
The most senior institution is the Academy of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces. Located in Kiyv, the Academy now occupies the building which housed 
the former Military Academy of Troop Air Defense down to May 1992. The 
Academy provides "senior command courses" to senior officers from the four 
arms of service. The ten-month courses are "as elsewhere in the world," 
according to Colonel Yury Prokof'ev, the Chief of the Military Education 
Directorate. 
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To date, there has been no mention of a Ukrainian "General Staff 
Academy," providing higher strategic command courses for senior officers. 
Promising officers continue to be sent to the General Staff Academy in 
Moscow. In the long-term it is hoped to send promising officers to Staff 
Colleges in the West. At present, two senior officers are on a one-year course 
in the United States. 
After the Academy of the UAF, the Kharkiv Military University is the 
most important of the new teaching institutions to be established in Ukraine. 
This university is located on the premises of the former Military Engineer Radio 
Technical Academy of the Air Defense Forces, and trains radio electronics 
specialists for the service branches. In addition, it trains specialists in strategic 
automated command and control systems.  [Ref. 102] 
2.        Senior Military Institutes 
The term "institute" in its military connotation is a radically new concept. 
The Ukrainian Cabinet 1992 Decree provides for the establishment of seven 
Military Institutes, which rank between military school and academy status. 
The Kiev Military Institute of Humanities provides courses in social sciences, 
personnel management, the humanities, psychology, and pedagogy. Courses 
last 10-12 months and graduates are awarded diplomas equal in status to a 
Bachelors Degree, and will be expected eventually to study for a Masters 
Degree in their field of expertise. 
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The Kiev Military Institute of Command Systems and Communications 
was designated as the Military Institute of Command Systems and Intelligence. 
The provision of military communications specialists and electronics 
intelligence (ELINT) experts, is regarded as a top priority by the Ukrainian 
Defense Ministry. 
The remaining five Institutes are controlled by the respective services: 
the Ground Defense Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and the Navy. [Ref. 
103] 
3.       Ground Defense Forces 
By September 1993, the Ukrainian Ground Defense Forces controlled two 
Military Institutes and two Military Lyceums. The Kiev Military Institute of the 
Ground Defense Forces replaced and integrated the Kiev Higher Tank Engineer 
School and the Kiev Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Engineer School. The 
Institute opened on 1 September 1992. The Odessa Military Institute of the 
Ground Defense Forces also opened on 1 September 1992. These two institutes 
provide six- to twelve-month courses for all-arms battalion/ brigade 
commanders - motor rifle, artillery, and tank - and in essence fulfill the role 
formerly played in the education of the junior command by the Frunze Military 
Academy, the Artillery Academy, and the Tank Troops Academy in Moscow. 
The basic education of officer cadets who normally take the entrance 
examination at 18 years of age is now provided by the Military Lyceum, an 
innovation and deliberate attempt by Ukrainian authorities to erase the links 
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with the former Soviet military school. Two Ground Forces Military Lyceums 
opened on 1st September 1992: the Kiev Military Lyceum for motor rifle and 
tank commanders; and the Sumi Military Lyceum for junior artillery 
commanders.  [Ref. 104] 
4.       Air Force Educational System 
The gap left by the loss of free access to the Moscow Air Academy has 
been keenly felt by the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. In order to make good the 
deficiency at a higher level, a plan was put forward in March by Defense 
Minister Morozov to combine a number of former Soviet military aviation 
schools to create two Air Force Institutes. With the creation of the Kiev Air 
Force Institute emphasis is on training high-class engineers during a five-year 
course. A special faculty monitors developments in new generation aerospace 
technology, and recalls senior specialists for short refresher courses. 
The second Air Forces Institute, located in Kharkov acquired the bulk of 
the former institutions. It is the main center for training pilots, navigators, and 
junior commanders for the Ukrainian Air Forces. Courses are of four to five 
years duration. Given the congested airspace over Kharkov, the Institute 
continues to maintain airfields located respectively in Chernigov and Lugansk 
for basic flight training. 
Beneath the two senior Air Force Institutes are two Military Lyceums. 
The Chernihiv Military Lyceum was formed with a role to provide basic 
"familiarization" courses of six- to twelve months duration for 18-20 year old 
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cadets. Only after completing the course successfully will they then go on to 
complete their education at the KharMv Air Force Institute, following a period 
of service with an aviation unit. The second Lyceum, located in KharMv, trains 
junior fitters and mechanics in 12-month courses. Experience will be grafted 
onto theory during service in an aviation unit prior to going on to Kiyv Air 
Force Institute. 
Since the Air Defense Forces were swallowed by the Air Force, the Air 
Defense community retains two Lyceums. The Dneipropetrovsk Military 
Lyceum is the main center for training junior commanders for ground-based 
SAM units. The second institution, the Zhitomir Military Lyceum provides 
courses for radio electronic air surveillance and tracking officers.  [Ref. 105] 
5.       Ukrainian Naval Education 
Despite the outcry in Kiev over the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian Navy 
will be the smallest of the four services. Confined to the Black Sea, in 
conjunction with two brigades of the former USSR KGB Border Troops, its role 
will be coastal protection. The main center for training naval officers will be 
the Sevastopol Naval Institute. There is as yet no provision to establish a Naval 
Lyceum along the lines of the former Soviet Nakhimov Naval School for 14-18 
year old cadets, the naval equivalent of the Suvorov Military School. 
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6.        Specialist Military Education 
The structure of specialist training provided for support services, 
reservist officers, and adolescents liable or volunteering for premilitary training, 
has been fundamentally reorganized in line with national security requirements. 
At the summit of the specialist military educational pyramid are three Military 
Lyceums, each in turn established on the basis of a former Soviet military 
institution. 
The Lviv Military Lyceum emphasizes the role of the teaching staff in 
instilling in the cadets a sense of their Ukrainian heritage and loyalty to the 
Armed Forces. The Lvov Military Lyceum has another important responsibility: 
producing physical training instructors for the Armed Forces. 
The two remaining Lyceums replace former military-political schools. 
The Donetsk Military Lyceum took over the Donets Higher Military Political 
School of Engineers and Signals Troops. On the basis of a much expanded 
program, it trains junior specialists. The Simferopol Military Lyceum trains 
junior military construction engineers, while military environmental specialists 
are trained at the Crimean Institute of Nature Conservation and Construction 
of Spas. 
Reservist training presents a major headache for the UAF. Plans are 
being drawn to reorganize and tighten control on reservists. One preliminary 
step has already been forced on the Defense Ministry, namely the closure of 
almost half of the "military chairs" attached to higher schools, institutes, and 
state universities throughout Ukraine.  This is in answer to calls by political 
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radicals and "democratic groups," most of whom were calling for a total ban on 
all reservist training on the campus. By mid-1993, the number of military 
chairs was to be cut from 73 to 43, some of which were to be relocated some 
distance from the campus. The statutory three- to four-year period of reservist 
training requirement for commissioning of former NCOs to the reserve rank of 
Junior Lieutenant (Mladshiy leutenant), established in 1969, has been retained. 
[Ref. 106] 
7.       Security and Intelligence Services 
No review of the new Ukrainian regime of military education would be 
complete without a brief reference to the future structure of training for 
security, counter-intelligence, and secret intelligence (strategicheskaya 
razvedka) officials. 
Most senior officials of the former Ukrainian security and intelligence 
services, including many non-Ukrainians, continue to serve in the new state 
organs. There has, however, been a radical reassessment of training aimed at 
producing an efficient and dedicated national service, controlled by a highly 
professional senior elite. The former Higher School of the Ukrainian Internal 
Affairs Ministry has been reorganized to form the Academy of Ukrainian 
Internal Affairs, complete with a Military Faculty for students from the Armed 
Forces. 
The most important change is the establishment of the Institute for 
Training Counter-intelligence Personnel, under the control of the Ukrainian 
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Security Service (former Ukrainian KGB). The Institute has a staff of 50 
officials and senior academics. The basic course for future Security Services 
(counter-intelligence and secret intelligence), Border Troops, and Armed Forces 
officers, lasts five years. The first students took an oath of loyalty on 30 August 
1992. Commenting on the Institute, Major General Vasily Gorbatyuk, a 50-year 
old veteran of the Ukrainian KGB, now First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian 
Security Service, stressed that, apart from "learning the 'ins and outs' of our 
unique profession", in the course of the five-year program, students would 
devote much of their time to studying the constitution and legal restraints 
required to be observed by security officials during the tenure of their 
operations.  [Ref. 107] 
D.       BASE FORCE 
If military reform is implemented along the general lines of the 
conceptual plan and within the ceilings established by the Ukrainian Supreme 
Council and the CFE treaty, by the end of 1995, the Ukrainian armed forces and 
i 
their equipment will consist approximately of the following strengths (declared 
strengths in 1992 are in parentheses): personnel: 450,000 (726,000, not 
including the paramilitary forces such as the national guard, internal troops, 
border troops or railroad troops); tanks: 4,080 (6,300); armed combat vehicles: 
5,050 (6,170); artillery: 4,040 (3,080); antitank weapons: 6,000; SAM sites: 934; 
aircraft: 1,090 (1,380); combat helicopters: 240 (240); and ships: 277. By any 
account, it is a formidable force in Europe, the largest after that of Russia. But 
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these reforms will not be easy. There are a number of serious problems that 
the Ukrainian military leadership will have to solve before they can claim 
success [Ref. 108]. These dilemmas are mostly sociological in nature and are 
addressed in the following chapter. 
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VL ETHNIC SECURITY MAP 
The purpose of this section is to describe the complex ethnic situation in 
Ukraine while it was under Soviet rule and than show how the established 
"ethnic security map" has affected present day Ukraine's military and its loyalty 
to Ukraine. This chapter analyzes the pre-independence period and the "ethnic 
security map" of the SAF by focusing on the theoretical aspect of the ethnic 
factor using the works of N.F. Dreiszinger, R.A. Preston, and Teresa Rakowska- 
Harmstone. It allows analysts to better understand the present ethnic 
dilemma's and sociological issues plaguing the UAF in an independent state. 
Although this chapter studies the SAF and its techniques of integration, 
it is crucial for the reader to keep in mind what has been coerced onto Ukraine 
and its people for the last century. Focus is given to the UAF that is presently 
struggling to Ukrainianize its force. This force has been brought up in a 
closeted Soviet environment and indoctrinated with the Communist ideology 
and world outlook. It educated personnel to think as being the elite social 
strata of the Soviet (not national) society imbued with Russian military 
traditions and history. 
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A.       DREEINGER AND PRESTON MODELS APPLIED TO SAF 
Most armed forces in the world today are multi-ethnic and are composed 
of men and women of different races or cultures, often speaking different 
languages or dialects. This has existed since ancient times. The immediate 
reason for this phenomenon was that, for the most part, rulers were bent on 
conquest armies which were often tools in which soldiers, and in some cases 
the entire armies of subject nations, were cajoled to serve. However, another 
fundamental reason for the existence of multi-ethnic armies in the past and the 
present is the fact that nations tended to be polyethnic. [Ref. 109] This equally 
applies to the composition of the SAF. In the case of the Soviet Union the SAF 
were made of several nationalities or racial groups. It was a force that was 
both multi-ethnic (meaning that it was composed of more than one cultural 
group of the same race) and multi-racial (it was also composed of personnel of 
asiatic features). 
Furthermore, as Dreizinger and Preston mention in their essay, 
"Polyethnicity and Armed Forces," in some polyethnic armed forces the officer 
corps was made up of the members of the ethnic group (or groups) different 
from other ranks. This was very evident in the SAF. In the SAF, what 
complicated the difficult situation further was the fact that countries tended to 
use the "ethnic factor" in their armed forces for different purposes. These 
purposes were political rather than military. Therefore a polyethnic armed 
forces could be an instrument of ethnic segregation and/or oppression: it can 
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be used to enhance the social and political position of one ethnic group vis-a-vis 
another ethnic group. In the case of the SAF the Russians became the 
dominant ethnic group, which attempted to impose political order and structure 
over other groups within the military (i.e., Ukrainians). At the same time, the 
ethnic factors in the SAF were used to appease a particular group (the 
Russians) and were used to promote national (ethnic - Russian) integrity and 
unity.  [Ref. 110] 
B.        RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE STUDY 
The ethnic factor in the SAF is the subject of Professor Teresa 
Rakowska-Harmstone's study, which described the SAF which were truly multi- 
ethnic forces, reflecting the demographic situation of the USSR: Russians made 
up only one half of that country's population, while the other half was 
composed of close to a hundred ethnic groups. As a result, in the Soviet 
military numerous ethnic problems would have existed at greater levels, if the 
Soviet leadership would not have attempted to "russify" its forces in the way it 
attempted to. 
One of the enduring characteristics of the Russian military both in Tsarist 
and post-revolutionary times, was the use of the armed forces as an instrument 
of societal integration, more precisely, as a means of imposing an official 
culture and world view upon Russia's various nationalities. Under tsarist rule 
this meant spreading the triad of Orthodox religion, political conservatism, and 
the Russian language.    In the post-revolutionary era, Marxist theory and 
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Leninist political practice replaced the religious and political overtones of the 
earlier days; but promotion of the Russian language and culture continued. In 
the next chapter, focus will shift to the UAF and how it is attempting to reverse 
the process of "Sovietization" by countering the old ideology, the Russia 
language and culture, and the Russian military traditions by "Ukrainianizing" 
its forces, with its own democratic vision, its own language, history, culture and 
military tradition. It is a constant fight for the loyalty of the soldier to its state, 
by insuring that Ukraine's forces know were they came from and what they are 
fighting for.  [Ref. Ill] 
Overall, the Russian's distrusted their nationalities and believed they 
needed to maintain their dominion over them. To maintain strong control they 
manipulated ethnic make-up of various branches of the Soviet military, to 
further their overall objectives. They further attempted to use Russian history, 
culture, tradition and language in order to create a common fabric, that would 
hold the forces together. This was done by attempting to stamp out ethnic 
diversity within its military. The SAF were seen as the "school of the nation." 
The conscripts were inculcated with a set of common Soviet values and 
behavioral patterns that maximized the forces' cohesion and combat readiness, 
while also endowing each soldier with a capability to transcend the parochial 
confines of his native environment and to lead socially useful civilian life 
following the service. In this task the management in the forces of the ethnic 
factor was a major significance. It was at the center of concern of the SAFs 
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organization and manpower distribution, and in the forefront of political- 
military training.  [Ref. 112] 
The ethnic mix of each conscript cohort reflected that of the country at 
large, but their distribution in the ranks fit an "ethnic security map" that favored 
the Russian element. In the 1980s the Russian's comprised approximately half 
of the Soviet population. The other half was made up of more than one 
hundred national groups, among whom were other Slavs (Ukrainians and 
Belorussians) and the rapidly expanding Moslem group. Although these other 
groups were represented in the armed forces they did not man key decision 
making roles or posts. Glass ceilings existed, in many areas, such as the 
General Staff, command positions in the strategic forces (nuclear, airborne or 
spetsnatz units). Such groups had limited access. 
Many of these problems are presently being reversed in the UAF. 
Progress is difficult and will probably be slow, since many of its personnel have 
been productive members of the Soviet military, many of whom at the top 
positions are ethnic Russians. 
C.       ETHNIC COMPOSITION 
There is a serious ethnic imbalance within the armed forces of Ukraine. 
Ethnic Russians make up approximately 90 percent of Ukraine's general 
officers; around 60 percent of field grade officers in the ground forces (the 
percentage is higher in the air force and navy); 53 percent of the Ukrainian 
General Staff. The situation is somewhat more favorable to ethnic Ukrainians 
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in the company grade officer ranks, especially as the Ukrainian military schools 
have begun to graduate cohorts of native commissioned officers and warrant 
officers. At the same time, the Ukrainian ministry of defense estimates that 
there are over 200,000 Ukrainian ethnic military personnel serving outside 
Ukraine, mostly in the armed forces of the Russian Federation, many of whom 
want to transfer to the UAF. The ethnic situation is still better in the enlisted 
ranks, as the new 18-month term of service provides for automatic and period 
turnover in personnel, thus making the enlisted ranks reflect the general ethnic 
ration in the Ukrainian society (which is 73 percent ethnic Ukrainian) [Ref. 
113]. Since the ranks are filled with low quality conscripts who are easily 
drawn to crime and since the poorly paid military, is dominated by an officer 
corp that is primarily Russian, there is either a lack of interest or a resistance 
to "Ukrainianization." This was most evident when the ethnic Russians, who 
form a majority in many units resented the establishment of the Social 
Psychological Service which was to nationalize recruits. 
According to the acting head of the defense Ministry's personnel 
directorate, Colonel Ivan Khomiak, as of August 1995, ethnic Ukrainians now 
constitute 59 percent of the UAF as opposed to 45 percent on 1993. He said 
that the percentage of ethnic Russians had dropped from 48 percent in 1993 to 
37 percent, and added that five of the six new generals appointed in 1995 were 
also Ukrainian. He stressed, however, that Ukrainian citizenship and not ethnic 
origin was the major criterion in the formation of the UAF.  [Ref. 114] 
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VH. SOCIOLOGICAL ISSUES 
This chapter builds on the material of the previous chapter and focuses 
on the present day re-education process ('Ukrainianization") that is ongoing in 
Ukraine and also addresses other sociological issues that are intertwined 
directly or indirectly with the ethnic issue. This chapter, in concert with the 
previous one, allows us to answer the question: "Are the UAF loyal to the 
Ukrainian state?" 
Having made the decision to "nationalize" all armed forces located on the 
territory of Ukraine on the eve of its independence, the Ukrainian political and 
military leadership has, by the same token, inherited numerous problems that 
have a serious impact on morale, discipline, readiness and combat sustainability 
[Ref. 115]. The Chechen operation launched by Russia in December 1994 
highlighted the crisis affecting the RAF. A similar crisis affecting the UAF 
appears to be as bad, if not worse. This situation reflects not only Ukraine's 
military inheritance but also the current socio-economic situation in the country 
as a whole. Without doubt, morale in the Ukrainian armed forces is at an all- 
time low. The number of cases where there has been a breach of regulations 
by servicemen in 1994 grew by 47 percent compared with the previous year 
while criminal proceedings increased by almost 50 percent. Not surprisingly, 
defense Minister Valery Shmarov has complained that the armed forces were 
"infested with bribery, corruption, and theft" [Ref. 116]. 
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The decline in discipline in the armed forces has been blamed on the 
general economic malaise which has produced a large number of social 
problems, as well as low salaries and low prestige. Many officers are without 
housing in spite of the promise that the situation was to have been corrected 
by the construction of accommodation with funds received from the sale of 
surplus military equipment. Almost half of all suicides involve military officers, 
a rate which is growing because of poor standards of servicemen [Ref. 117]. 
Following are some of the salient problems they face and solutions they are 
employing to reverse the effects of being under Soviet control for so many 
years. 
A,       FORCE CONVERSION AND QUALITY OF LIFE 
While the reduction of excess equipment as mandated by the CFE 
agreement has reportedly been proceeding in a relatively smooth manner, the 
task of reducing military manpower is almost daunting in magnitude. It is 
complicated by the commitment of the Ukrainian government to a somewhat 
generous entitlement and "safety net" programs. The latter calls for providing 
living quarters, retraining, job placement or social security for approximately 
150,000 military officers and noncommissioned officers who are slated to be, 
or are already deactivated and placed in a reserve status or retired prior to 1995 
[Ref. 118]. Defense Minister Shmarov admitted that 72,000 service personnel 
have no housing [Ref. 119]. 
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Pay frequently does not arrive and/or is insufficient to cover basic 
requirements. In February 1994, former Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky flew 
with a group of officers from the Central Staff to the 28th All-Arms Division 
based near Odessa after the officer corps went on strike following repeated and 
prolonged delays in the payment of their salaries. Similar protests took place 
at the Ivano-Frankivsk air base and, in November 1994, a rally of servicemen 
in Kiev demanded better social protection and housing for officers. [Ref. 120] 
Morale is low and draft evasion consequently high. Most young people 
aspire to careers in business or in the proliferating Mafia gangs. The new 
entrepreneurs and Mafia gangs are the focus of the awe and aspiration of 
Ukraine's young. Although the army, together with the clergy, is Ukraine's 
most respected institution, it is also one of the least understood. Ukrainian 
officers are witnessing the erosion of the prestige and benefits which once 
attracted them to their profession. During the winter of 1993-1994, they 
frequently remained unpaid from one month to the next. When they did 
receive their pay, they were forced to choose whether to spend it on heating, 
rent, food, or clothing, but seldom could they afford more than one of these 
options. Officers face chronic housing problems: the returnees from Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union swelled the demand for housing above the 
limit of what could be supplied.  [Ref. 121] 
These dilemmas considerably slow the process of force reduction and 
constrain military reforms. More significantly, they impart a sense of insecurity 
among the officers who are unsure of their future, and have a deleterious effect 
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on the morale and personal interest of these officers and attention to their job 
assignment. 
Some officers have formed protective, albeit technically illegal, 
associations or unions to lobby for their personal welfare and social protection. 
Thus far, over 90 percent of the members of the Ukraine's armed forces have 
reportedly sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian state. But how many did so out 
of a deep sense of loyalty rather than sheer socio-economic or opportunistic 
considerations is almost impossible to determine. The present ongoing serious 
economic downturn in Ukraine can only exacerbate the low morale among the 
Ukrainian military and bring into question the degree of their loyalty to Ukraine 
in time of a crisis.  [Ref. 122] 
B.       LANGUAGE OF COMMAND 
Closely related to the issue of the ethnic makeup of the Ukrainian armed 
forces is the language of command and communication as one of the legacies 
from the Soviet period. Russian was the language of command and 
communication within the Soviet armed forces from their origin, making it a 
powerful tool of Russification. This was abetted by an intensive Russification 
program in the society at large, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. This 
condition not only prevented the development of non-Russian military and 
technical terminology, but it also hindered the very use of native language in 
the armed forces.  [Ref. 123] 
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Although the Ukrainian government has been careful to define 
citizenship based on residency and not ethnicity, Ukrainian national sentiment 
is likely to grow as economic conditions remain poor. The nationalist card will 
be an easy and effective one for politicians to play [Ref. 124]. Increasing the 
ethnic Ukrainian component of the officer corps by removing ethnic Russians 
will be an easy way to cater to nationalist sentiments. One of the strongest 
paths towards greater Ukrainianization will be to make Ukrainian the official 
language of government institutions, including the armed forces [Ref. 125]. In 
accordance with the Ukrainian Law on Languages, former President Morozov 
issued an order mandating the gradual transition to Ukrainian in the armed 
forces. The Law on Languages called for a three- to five-year period for 
employees of state institutions to learn Ukrainian, beginning in 1990. This 
policy naturally favored Ukrainians, although those Russians who spoke or 
learned Ukrainian would be able to maintain their positions. 
The introduction of Ukrainian as the official language met with great 
difficulties and opposition in the Army in which 35 percent are native Russian 
speakers. Some 30 percent of Ukrainians cannot speak their native language, 
not to mention sizeable groups of Belorussians and Poles, and a handful of 
Romanians. Whereas great strides had been made in establishing Ukrainian 
as the "official language on the drill square and on exercise," mastering military 
terminology was proving problematic [Ref. 126]. It will be some time before 
the current effort at introducing Ukrainian as the language of command and 
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communications into the armed forces becomes a reality [Ref. 127]. Until then, 
it will remain one of the causes of internal dissonance within the armed forces. 
C.       REEDUCATION PROGRAM 
Aside from such factors as one's military career, socio-economic well- 
being and morale within the Ukrainian military, another determinant of loyalty 
is ideology. All officers in the senior ranks now serving in the Ukrainian armed 
forces were brought up in a closeted Soviet environment and indoctrinated with 
the communist ideology and world outlook. They were taught to think as being 
the elite social strata of the Soviet (not national) society and were imbued with 
Russian military tradition and history. This was a socio-psychological package 
in which there was no room for any reference to the Ukrainian military 
tradition or history prior to 1917. Suddenly, after August 1991, these officers, 
many disoriented by the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union, found themselves 
in the Ukrainian national armed forces and were being asked to swear 
allegiance to a new state that only months before they could not even imagine. 
As a result, the Ukrainian military leadership has been faced with a giant and 
very sensitive task - political re-education of its inherited officer corps. 
The Ukrainian Parliament abolished the former Soviet political officer 
structure in the armed forces and adopted a law on the socio-psychological 
"reeducation" of the Ukrainian military. A new reeducational structure, called 
the "Socio-Psychological Service," has been established throughout the armed 
forces (down to company level). It is designed to impart a Ukrainian national 
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security identity by introducing the basic tenets of Ukrainian history, language 
and military tradition, and to promote democratization of the armed forces. 
This effort understandably has created some tension within the armed forces. 
[Ref. 128] As mentioned earlier, the process of "Ukrainianization" of the armed 
forces reflects the state-wide debate over the proper relationship of the 
Ukrainian language and culture to its Russian equivalent. As with the state as 
a whole, compromises have been reached and serious conflicts avoided. The 
most contentious change within the armed forces was the replacement of 
Marxist-Leninist political education with Ukrainian linguistic and cultural 
education. 
The policy of greater Ukrainianization of the officer corps has created 
resentment among many ethnic Russians who swore allegiance to Ukraine due 
to professional and social guarantees made by the government. Many Russian 
officers see themselves as the victims of discrimination and broken promises. 
Such a development may in the future increase tensions both between the two 
nationalities inside Ukraine (Ukraine's population is 22 percent ethnic Russian, 
with much higher concentrations in certain areas - the Crimea, for example, is 
67 percent Russian) and between the Ukrainian and Russian governments. 
[Ref. 129] 
Aside from ideological re-education, programs now exist that attempt to 
train military retirees for civilian duty. The European Commission, together 
with Germany, the United Kingdom and the Soros Foundation, are establishing 
systems for the retraining of retired and discharged officers so that these 
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individuals can go into civilian society with something practical to offer. 
Training is based on small business management and specific trades such as 
vehicle or electrical repair. The combined financial contribution from the West 
runs to many millions of dollars. If the reduction of the armed forces to a 
strength of 250,000 is to be completed without the risk of destabilizing protest, 
then the Ukrainian government, together with its Western and CIS partners, 
must ensure that the esprit de corps of the officer corps is not further eroded. 
[Ref. 130] 
D.       UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL AND MILITARY TRADITIONS 
Ukrainian national historical and military traditions have been an 
important tool for attempting to mold former Soviet forces in Ukraine into the 
UAF. The UAF attempted to introduce these traditions through the work of the 
SPS, specialized courses and lectures, the designation of uniforms and 
insignias, and perhaps most importantly, the military press. However, 
Ukrainian national symbols have met considerable resistance from the 
conservative elements within the military and presumably, from the largely 
Russian officer corp. 
The hesitancy of the UAF to break the resistance to "Ukrainianization" 
is due not only to the entrenchment of the old guard within the military, but 
also to other factors.   While some Ukrainian traditions - the Cossack, the 
Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) - have gained general acceptance, others - 
the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) and the Waff en-SS Galician Division of the 
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World War II period - have generated considerable controversy and regional 
divisiveness. Moreover, Ukrainians seem to be willing to accept national 
symbols from the more distant past, but have not even fully discussed the more 
recent Soviet experience. There is almost a conspiracy of silence about Soviet 
Ukrainian period, because most Ukrainians are very well aware that 
independence was achieved when a faction of the communists decided to 
support this nationalist goal. Thus, national symbols, once completely 
forbidden, are now permitted and even encouraged as long as they do not 
challenge or offend the ex-communists, who are still relatively strong in 
Ukraine. Moreover, imperial and Soviet rule has resulted in widespread 
acceptance of a Russian and Soviet view of history even among Ukrainians. A 
change in outlook would require an extensive educational campaign that 
neither the government nor the military is prepared to undertake at this time. 
[Ref. 131] 
E.       EVSIGNIAS, FORMS OF ADDRESS AND COMMEMORATIONS 
Another way to de-Russify and de-Sovietize the armed forces has been 
to replace Soviet and Russian military terms and symbols with traditional 
Ukrainian ones. The SPS has cautiously drawn attention to what is Ukrainian 
nomenclature and what is intrinsically Russian. Instructors have routinely 
contributed articles for the military press on Ukrainian military traditions and 
symbols, and have participated actively in the cultural clubs that have sprung 
up spontaneously within the military. The link with the pre-Soviet Ukrainian 
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past is most important. The oath of allegiance, "I pledge to defend the 
Ukrainian State," is said to have precedence in practice as long as the 18th 
century. Proposals for insignias and symbols for the UAF have tended to evoke 
those that were standard for the UNR Army, with emphasis on the trident, the 
most common non-Soviet national symbol, which the Ukrainian parliament 
adopted for use as the state emblem of Ukraine. With regard to the uniform of 
the UAF, one proposal suggests that it be modelled on that of NATO, and that 
insignias of Kievan Rus' and the Cossack period be added. In 1993 the military 
announced that its official flag would be blue and yellow, the traditional 
national colors, on which would be inscribed the words, "Za Ukrainu, za yiyi 
vail" ("For Ukraine and Its Freedom"), taken from a popular Western Ukrainian 
military song of the UNR period, while a special UAF banner would employ the 
Zaporizhian Cossack crimson colors and patterns. Insignias of the Kievan Rus' 
and Cossack periods have been suggested for the army's uniform. The triumph 
of the trident in the armed services finally came in the late summer of 1993, 
when Defense Minister Konstantyn Morozov issued instructions to all units of 
the UAF to paint over all red stars and other Soviet insignias on vehicles with 
the Ukrainian trident and blue and yellow strips.  [Ref. 132] 
F.       CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The growing chorus of Ukrainian demands for separate armed forces and 
hostility towards ail-Union structures undoubtedly played a role in the 
disintegration of the former Soviet armed forces, as most visibly seen in their 
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failure to act to defend the coup d'etat in August 1991. The Ukrainian drive to 
establish separate armed forces between mid 1991 and mid 1992 was a highly 
popular move, backed by all of Ukraine's political parties and civic groups. The 
initially elected President and Parliament banned the Communist Party of 
Ukraine (CPU) between August 1991 - October 1993).  [Ref. 133] 
The nationalization of all Soviet conventional forces on Ukrainian 
territory was undertaken relatively quickly and without conflict (with the 
exception of the Black Sea Fleet). It was successful due to several reasons: a 
lack of ethnic conflicts in the republic (unlike in Moldova or Trans Caucasia), 
a large number of Ukrainian officers (unlike most other former Soviet republics 
apart from Russia), a willingness of Russian or Belorussian officers to take the 
loyalty oath of a fellow Slavic republic and the removal of the CPU from control 
of the military.  [Ref. 134] 
Civil-Military Relations have since become politicized in Ukraine. A poll 
shows that approximately 70 percent of military officers often think of political 
problems - only enterprise directors have a higher figure [Ref. 135]. The armed 
forces also have the highest public support of any state institution at 69 percent 
(only the Church is a close second). Approximately 65 percent of Ukrainians 
believe that the only force capable of guaranteeing law and order are the armed 
forces (reflecting the low public status of the militia), while 89 percent of 
officers believe that their main function is to protect the territorial integrity of 
the Ukrainian state [Ref. 136] (in comparison to only nine percent of the 
population who believe that this should be a first priority of the state) [Ref. 137]. 
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Overall, the role of the Ukrainian armed forces has remained the defense 
of the state's independence. This has required the need to imbue the armed 
forces with the "ideology of statehood" as the "only priority and object of 
defense against internal and external enemies." That an independent state 
cannot exist without its own armed forces is a fact widely accepted within 
Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian military, in comparison to Russian armed 
forces, are therefore more apolitical [Ref. 138]. At the same time, nearly 54 
percent believed that a violent conflict similar to that which took place in 
Moscow in September-October 1993 could occur in Ukraine [Ref. 139]. 
Departisation of the armed forces, which in 1992 was primarily directed 
against the communists, was openly stated by Ukrainian leaders as a necessity. 
But, at the same time, the military cannot become depoliticized: "the army 
cannot be on the sidelines of processes which are taking place in the country, 
remaining a passive observer of conflict situations" [Ref. 140]. In the event of 
domestic or external conflict, the military should stand on the side of the 
constitutional authorities and state interests - not the interests of political 
forces. Colonel Vitaliy Chechylo, a leading military author, states that this 
would be best achieved by civilian control of the Ministry of Defense. This did 
indeed occur when Valeriy Shmarov was selected as the first civilian Minister 
of Defense in 1994. "To attempt to achieve the complete depoliticization of the 
army is not possible, but it is imperative that it be fully departised." If the 
armed forces were to become depoliticized they could begin to act as an 
independent force with their own political agenda.  [Ref. 141] 
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It has been difficult to separate the armed forces from the political 
campaigns and debates raging across Ukraine in Spring 1994. At nearly half 
of the voting districts in the Carpathian military districts, both civilians and 
military servicemen were voting together. In addition, the military authorities 
were tasked with preventing unsanctioned election speeches by candidates [Ref. 
142]. At a meeting of the Ministry of Defense collegium on 29 April 1994, 
General-Major Volodymyr Petenko, presidential military adviser, asked the 
generals who were present to collect signatures within the armed forces in 
support of Leonid Kravchuk to ensure his place in the presidential elections on 
26 June (candidates required 100,000 signatures to be registered). Even though 
there were six other presidential candidates, the military support for Kravchuk 
did not work out and Leonid Kuchma became the new President of Ukraine 
[Ref. 143]. 
G.       CONCLUSION 
The deteriorating economic situation in the country, social deprivations 
(lack of housing and skyrocketing inflation) and career uncertainty born of 
prospects of en masse separation from the service have all had their impact on 
the morale and commitment of officers, especially those with families. The 
situation in the enlisted ranks is somewhat better. The reporting call-up rate 
at recruiting centers has been relatively adequate. Military discipline, however, 
has been somewhat lax. The tradition of dedovshchina (barrack hazing), an 
often brutal and widespread practice in the former Soviet armed forces, has not 
103 
yet been completely eradicated. As a result, the rate of desertion and absences 
without leave, especially in the ground forces, has been relatively high. [Ref. 
144] 
This leads us to the crucial question: "Are the UAF loyal to the Ukrainian 
state?" The Ukrainization of the UAF, like so many issues in Ukraine, is at a 
crossroads. Although the UAF has inherited an "ethnic security map" of the 
former Soviet Union, it has made some progress in reversing its effects. This 
problem is being rectified primarily by allowing ethnic Ukrainians to higher 
decision making posts in the military through equal competition based on 
citizenship rather than on ethnicity. Ukraine has successfully waged a 
reeducation campaign to educate the officer corp and its troops through various 
programs that would make them better "Ukrainian" soldiers. Even though 
additional work is still required to make the UAF more patriotic, they are 
generally loyal to the Ukrainian state and its people. 
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Vffl. ARE THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES A CREDIBLE DETERRENT 
TO NEIGHBORING INCURSIONS? 
It is difficult to evaluate the military capability of the Ukrainian armed 
forces (namely the army and air force, since the navy is still in the formation 
stage) at a time of transition and radical reforms because there is a partiality 
of sufficient data and information. This chapter will first look at the budgetary 
problems facing the UAF and then will apply four major components of military 
capability - force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability - to the 
Ukrainian armed forces as a frame of reference. This analysis yields 
incomplete and mixed results. 
A.       BUDGETARY PROBLEMS 
As of February 1994, only ten percent of the required funds for the 
armed forces had been allocated, according to the then head of the Economic- 
Financial Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, General Ivan Shtopenko. The 
Ministry of Defense had asked for $1.8 billion US (63.7 trillion karbovanets) but 
was allocated only a fraction of this figure. On 6 April 1995, the Ukrainian 
Parliament voted in favor of its first real budget in order to qualify for an IMF 
stabilization loan of over $1.5 billion US, which was essential for President 
Kuchma's reform program. As a result, expenditure was reduced by four 
percent and the largest cut was made in the armed forces. Total defense 
expenditure this year will be only $757 million US  (106 trillion karbovanets) 
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of which the army will receive $657 million US . (Appendix M - Military budget 
spending as a percentage of GDP) This represents only 4.3 percent of 
Ukraine's total budget, compared with 21.3 percent of Russia's total budget 
spent on the military.  [Ref. 145] 
All branches of the security forces have been bit by the new budgetary 
cuts. The priority allocation within the budget will be for internal security 
forces - National Guard, Ministry of Interior Internal Troops and Convoy 
Troops, Berkut riot police, Militia Spetznaz and the State Protection Service - 
in contrast to the regular armed forces. The greatest cuts would be to the 
Security Service, the State Customs Committee and the Border troops, 
according to Anatoliy Kovtun, Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on 
Budget Affairs. The collegium of the State Borders (Derzhkomkordori) has 
already complained that the sum allocated to maintain border troops in 1995 
only covered 44 percent of their real needs. The collegium would, therefore, 
determine priorities in administering the funds such as cash payments, and the 
provision of goods and foodstuffs to border guards. The shortage of funds does 
not, however, alter Ukraine's steadfast opposition to the joint protection of CIS 
external borders, but it did limit the ability to equip the new posts on the border 
with Russia, which were only installed in early 1993.  [Ref. 146] 
The Defense Minister has complained that the budget allocation for 1995 
was insufficient to allow for even elementary modernization of weapons and 
equipment and he expressed fear that the armed forces "will become unfit for 
action." "We have been unable to pay sufficient attention to scientific trends 
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and purchase new weaponry," he claimed. "Funds are barely sufficient to 
maintain the armed forces, let alone develop them. If we continue to act in this 
way, we risk crossing a Rubicon beyond which the negative processes now 
under way will be irreversible." Defense Minister Shmarov has calculated that 
141.1 trillion karbovanets are required to finance all the needs of the armed 
forces. 
The lack of money has already lead to a reduction of 65,000 personnel 
and the proposed sale of military installations and land. But, as Ukrainian 
military commentators have pointed out, the reduction in the number of officers 
leads to other costs, such as housing. The most successful branch of the armed 
forces which has been able to obtain additional sources of funding is 
transportation aviation. It received $1.5 million US in 1994, and another $3 
million US is owed by civilian airlines. Foodstuffs are provided free of charge 
by some regions to the Ukrainian navy while others have agreed to purchase 
apartments for naval officers. The length of conscription may be reduced from 
two years to 18 months.  [Ref. 147] 
The current head of the Financial-Economic Directorate, Major General 
Hryhorii Kucharskyi, has stated that while the armed forces received 34 percent 
of their financial needs in 1993-1994, they currently receive only 28 percent. 
In 1995, the budget allocation would be sufficient only for 16.9 percent of 
armed forces requirements. This would only cover the most basic areas, such 
as foodstuffs, salaries and communal utilities.    Military reform would be 
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severely harmed as only 5-12 percent of the allocated funds would be available 
for training and new technology.  [Ref. 148] 
B.       FORCE STRUCTURE 
Presently, the UAF are suffering a shortage of manpower mainly due to 
the very high numbers being granted deferment from compulsory service. 
These deferments are granted to many candidates who have either medical 
problems or are physically unable to perform military service. In addition, 
corruption has allowed many parents to either pay off the recruiting boards or 
doctors in order to falsify medical status. The length of the period of 
compulsory service has therefore been extended from eighteen months to two 
years. 
Both Ukraine and Russia are including certain naval air and coastal 
defense forces in their data returns regarding personnel reductions to the CFE 
Treaty. The reorganization of the Army has continued with the three military 
districts being replaced by two operational commands, Western and Southern. 
Each has three corps. The artillery corps has been disbanded, four motor rifle 
divisions have been converted to mechanized divisions, two have been given 
reserve status and four have been disbanded. Two more mechanized brigades 
have been created and the formation of the air-mobile division, which 
comprises one airborne and one air mobile brigades and one artillery regiment, 
has been completed. Plans are to reduce the manpower strength of the armed 
forces to some 450,000 by the end of 1995.  [Ref. 149] 
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Overall, the force structure being implemented over the next three to five 
years seems to be adequate for Ukraine's needs. The planning provides for 
reasonable sufficiency of forces, especially ground forces, with a good mix of 
units by type and emphasis on mobility and maneuverability. By abolishing the 
former Soviet operational armies and making the corps the primary command 
and control maneuver organization and by increasing the number of 
independent brigades, the Ukrainian force planners seem to favor smaller and 
lighter units that will permit them to form force packages to meet specific 
military operational requirements. These units will be fully manned and 
combat capable, and in contrast to former Soviet force structure policies, 
current Ukrainian plans do not call for any cadre or partially manned units. By 
reducing the tank divisions from four to one by 1999, two" artillery divisions and 
three brigades to nine artillery brigades and by converting the airborne units 
into airmobile forces, the Ukrainian military planners seem to stress defensive 
rather than offensive combat or force-projection capability of their ground 
forces. The projected conversion of present motorized rifle divisions and 
brigades will afford them greater mobility and maneuverability. The ability of 
the Ukrainian armed forces to transition to wartime operations, however, is 
hard to estimate at this time. The present forces constitute a large pool of 
trained manpower. There is an adequate force reconstitution capability. The 
former Soviet mobilization structure, commissariats, is still basically intact. 
Ukraine has a pool of one-million men with military service within the last five 
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years, which will permit the Ukrainian defense leadership to generate new 
forces to meet possible future major military threats.  [Ref. 150] 
C.       MODERNIZATION 
The Ukrainian military establishment inherited more than enough quality 
weapons systems and parts from the Soviet Union. Ukraine contains some 15 
percent of the former Soviet defense industrial and military research and 
development facilities and is the second-largest producer of military weapons 
and equipment after Russia among the successor states. It can assemble all 
major categories of military equipment, and some of its facilities have unique 
capabilities (such as shipbuilding, missile production and assembly). However, 
as a result of deliberate manufacturing interdependence practiced in the former 
Soviet Union, Ukraine depends on Russia for many components and 
subassemblies. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the arduous process of 
economic reform in Ukraine have resulted in a hiatus in force modernization, 
as the defense industry suffered from unavoidable disruption in research, 
development, production and fielding of new systems. Given time, however, 
the Ukrainian defense establishment has the potential for remedying these 
shortfalls by focusing on its own production capability, for which it has material 
resources and trained manpower.  [Ref. 151] 
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D.       READINESS 
Force readiness is a sum total of many elements such as quality of 
training, deployability, unit cohesion and morale. There is no doubt that the 
Ukrainian military establishment inherited a sufficient number of trained, 
qualified and well-equipped forces. Many of its officers and men have had 
combat experience in Afghanistan, and a battalion-size contingent performing 
a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia (already in its third rotation) is providing 
the Ukrainian ground forces with additional, albeit limited experience under 
combat conditions. The Ukrainian armed forces have excellent training bases 
and more than enough military schools. But the forces are in the process of a 
major down-sizing and restructuring under conditions of a deteriorating 
national economy, and this is bound to affect their readiness for the near term. 
[Ref. 152] 
Although Ukraine is second to Russia in military fuel storage capacity 
and has large untouched strategic fuel reserves, the current serious operational 
fuel shortage has constrained normal military training in both the army and the 
air force. No division-size unit field training has been conducted by the 
Ukrainian ground forces since their creation in 1991, although the number of 
command post exercises has increased. The ground army and the air force 
have weak logistic infrastructures. There is a shortage of spare parts and fuel 
in the forces, yet few funds are available for new equipment or research. In 
early 1994, the air force admitted that one-third of the country's aircraft stock 
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was unserviceable. Repair was impossible because there was not enough fuel 
to check engines and this led to the suspension of combat training. In early 
1993, each air force regiment had 14 combat crews but this had dropped to only 
four a year later. Hence, there is widespread fear that the lack of training will 
soon make Ukrainian pilots incapable of flying. Currently, pilots and tank 
drivers receive only 20-30 percent of the required minimum training levels, as 
set by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. In addition, not a single exercise at 
divisional level has been held since the inception of the Ukrainian armed forces 
in late 1991. The chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata, 
recently summed up that "the UAFs weakest point is that they are turning into 
an army of theoreticians."  [Ref. 153] 
The impact of the crisis can be gauged within the former Soviet 98th 
Airborne Division based in Bolgrad in southwestern Ukraine. The base now 
forms the core of Ukraine's 1st Airborne Division which has earned itself the 
reputation of the "most efficient and best trained" formation in the UAF. The 
major problem in the formation is low pay, especially when compared with the 
counterparts in Russia. For each parachute jump, the troops receive two 
percent of the official minimum, pay plus other bonuses, depending on length 
of service and number of previous jumps. In Russia, a payment of two percent 
is also paid for each jump, but this is not based on minimum pay, rather on that 
of a senior officer.  [Ref. 154] 
While reporting for semiannual military call-ups has been relatively 
adequate in Ukraine, the ratio of deferments seems to be excessively high (in 
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the fall 1993 call-up, two-thirds of all eligible men received some form of 
deferment). In addition, reported no-shows and desertion rates are still high. 
The military discipline in the armed forces, seriously impaired by the 
dissolution of the Soviet army, has not yet been fully restored. The relocation 
and new basing of restructured ground forces has just begun, which for the 
near term will affect their deployability in the event of a military threat on 
Ukraine's borders. These shortcomings notwithstanding, Ukraine does have a 
highly trained military officer corps that in time should be able to forge a well- 
trained and ready force.  [Ref. 155] 
E.        SUSTAINABILITY 
Sustainability implies that a military force can engage an aggressor in 
armed conflict over a "long period" by maintaining sound tactical and logistical 
control over the battlefield. This term assumes that the command and control 
elements have enough synchronization, firepower and supporting resources to 
find, fix and destroy the enemy before reaching a culminating point. The 
phrase "long period" signifies the duration that is required to overwhelm your 
opponent. 
Given the shortcomings discussed under the categories above, the 
sustainability of Ukrainian armed forces can be rated as fair to poor. This 
condition will persist until a sufficient number of operational maneuver units 
and their combat service support elements are recognized, reequipped and 
trained as collectives.    The army and the air force need to rebuild their 
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logistical infrastructures to be able to field and sustain their forces in a high- 
intensity conflict. In their present state the Ukrainian armed forces could 
sustain short-term combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the 
potential exists for the Ukrainian army to develop war fighting capability to 
deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional 
military power. It can defend its western borders and for the near term at least, 
provide a credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from 
Russia. This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and 
the other components of military capability - force structure, readiness and 
modernization - are brought to projected levels [Ref. 156]. The economic 
factors at this time seem to hamper quick progress in military reforms. 
However, with time, as the economy stabilizes and further ties with western 
countries develop, additional funding will become available for improving the 
force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability of the UAF. 
114 
IX. CONCLUSION 
As Ukraine's political scenario has developed, the requirements of Kiyv 
for the Ukrainian armed forces have become clear within the comparatively 
brief space of four years. Ukraine must be able to protect its northern and 
eastern borders in order to deter aggression from what many in Kiev still see 
as the possibility of a resurgent imperialist government to the north and east. 
Ukraine must be able to protect its shipping and ports in the Black Sea area. 
It must be able to maintain internal order during the deepening economic crisis. 
It must be able to respond, as it has done in the former Yugoslavia for the last 
two years, to the need for peacekeeping in the region, and it must be able to 
integrate with its allies and partners in both the CIS and NATO to that end. 
Ukraine has made slow but steady progress towards the transformation 
of its armed forces from the gigantic but useless force inherited from the Soviet 
Union. Ukraine's strategic position in Europe is unenviable, with invasion and 
conquest the unifying features of its history. There can be no doubt that 
Ukraine requires a flexible, mobile and modern defense capability, or that the 
process of achieving that aim will continue to be slowed by economic and 
political difficulties. Ukraine's strong desire for security guarantees from the 
West comes from a realistic appraisal of its situation, but that very situation 
requires a circumspect reaction from the West which many politicians and 
officers in Ukraine resent and mistrust. There are signs, however, that 
Ukraine's security thinking and policy are rapidly maturing. NATO appears to 
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have been impressed by Ukraine's enthusiastic embrace of the Partnership for 
Peace (PFP) and there can be little doubt from the Kiev perspective that this 
enthusiasm is genuine. I view the future for Ukraine's transformation of its 
armed forces and, correspondingly, the transformation of Ukraine's place in 
Europe's security architecture, with cautious optimism. 
Despite funding constraints, and reorganizational and the sociological 
dilemmas that plague the Ukrainian armed forces, it has made some progress 
within the last four years. This progress has been made primarily in the areas 
of personnel reductions, force restructuring and "Ukrainianization" of its officer 
corps. Although numerous problems impact on the efficiency of Ukraine's 
military, one should observe the security situation as objectively as possible, 
which means taking into consideration the relative capability of the most likely 
enemy - Russia. From this perspective, although Russia is militarily stronger 
than Ukraine, it too possesses a variety of its own problems. All the problems 
that are present in the UAF also exist in the RAF. The RAF forces have been 
demoralized and disrupted, negatively impacting on their performance. This 
is magnified by the unprofessional and brutal war in Chechnya. Studies and 
analysis show that the Russian troops lacked the desire and will to fight, that 
they lacked training required to conduct decentralized combined operations and 
that they suffered in command, control and communication (C3) when 
synchronizing the battlefield. Such weaknesses were wisely exploited by the 
largely outnumbered Chechen rebels [Ref. 157]. A similar approach may be 
used by the UAF, if an appropriate defense concept is developed. This would 
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require that the UAF employ the Pripiat Marshes and the Dnieper River to its 
advantage as geographical points of defense in order to bog down and wear 
away the enemy through delaying decentralized actions. This leads to the 
logical conclusion that if the RAF experienced problems with the Chechens, 
there is no reason why they would attempt to target a force that is even more 
numerically superior and one that attempts to use attritional defense strategy 
to inflict heavy casualties on the Russian forces. To make such logic a reality, 
it is crucial that Ukraine diplomatically articulate such a message, leaving no 
doubts for the Russian policy maker. Deterrence is Ukraine's best weapon 
against Russia. It may be reinforced by initially focusing on diplomatic efforts 
as a means to a resolution of tensions, which it already has done through the 
wording in its military doctrine. A comprehensive defense concept must be 
developed and openly laid out, so that potential enemies understand that 
interference in Ukraine's sovereignty would mean heavy casualty rates, thereby 
forcing the enemy to question their own will. 
In this net assessment of Ukraine's military, Chapter II focused on the 
years, 1989-1991. During this period, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
crucial events led to the legal basis for Ukraine's national security. Ukraine's 
endeavors to gain command of the military forces located within its boundaries 
were traced to four prominent events: the Declaration of Sovereignty, the 
August coup, the appointment of a Ukrainian Prime Minster and the oath of 
allegiance. This chapter showed how the hierarchy of obedience reversed in 
Ukraine, when the link joining the Soviet Union to the military forces in 
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Ukraine was severed and when a Ukrainian military chain of command was 
established. The process was later taken one step further when Ukraine turned 
the Soviet officer corps situated in Ukraine into a Ukrainian officer corps. 
From 1990-1992, the Soviet military's hierarchy of obedience disintegrated in 
Ukraine and a new Ukrainian one took its place. 
Chapter m, described the Ukrainian Military Doctrine in order to assist 
researchers and policy makers in better comprehending Ukraine's military and 
its intentions. This would allow them to better make assessments in the future 
on how these forces may be employed. Initially, this chapter summarized the 
ratified version of the Ukrainian Military Doctrine and later analyzed the 
document. This chapter stressed that Ukraine's military doctrine is defensive 
in nature, based on the principles of nonintervention, respect for the integrity 
of national borders and national independence of other states, and rejects the 
idea of using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. It studied the 
müitary-political, miktary-technical, and military-economic aspects of the 
doctrine. Overall, the military doctrine emphasizes the fundamental law of 
"reasonable defense sufficiency" in regulating the size and types of forces and 
the quantity and quality of conventional weapons and systems. It mentions a 
political commitment to a non-nuclear status and focuses on developing a 
modern, well-trained, well-armed and highly mobile force, with a special 
emphasis on precision weapons, intelligence and electronic warfare capability, 
air and space defense and sufficient air and sea power. To attain all this, it 
calls for the development and maintenance of a modern and economically 
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rational national defense industrial base. Although Ukraine possesses a 
military doctrine, it lacks temporal and spatial characteristics. It lacks temporal 
characteristics, since it is unclear whether today's realities or tasks for the 
future are meant. Also, a spatial characteristic is absent in the Doctrine, since 
the priorities and forms of military cooperation with other countries have still 
not been determined. Another paradox of this doctrine is that it lacks a general 
concept of military reforms. Since it does not reflect existing realities of the 
developing world and the European situation many Ukrainian policy makers 
and military leaders do not take the military doctrine seriously. Due to these 
problems it is not a document which allows policy makers to determine main 
directions of Ukrainian military policy. This in turn makes it difficult for 
Ukraine to create stable and legal relations with other countries. 
Chapter IV focused on the force structure and levels of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces, by discussing the CFE ceilings for Ukraine and the present 
declared strengths. This chapter argued that the problem of the UAF in the 
first three years of existence stemmed from two main sources: the failure to 
estimate correctly the effort and cost involved in reforming the armed forces; 
and opinions varied regarding what "reasonable defense sufficiency" meant in 
terms of technology and strength of the armed forces. To better understand the 
force levels and structure of the UAF this chapter reviewed the specifics as they 
apply to the Main (General) Staff, the army, the air force and the navy (Black 
Sea Fleet). Ukraine has reduced the number of men under arms by at least 
200,000 over the last three years. Current estimates put the number of service 
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men at approximately 450,000. The country's Defense Doctrine sets a target of 
250,000, and few Ukrainian servicemen or politicians now contest this figure. 
The eventual aim is to establish a professional armed services. This process will 
take some time. 
Chapter V discussed the strategic and operational factors (force levels, 
structure, potential application and education) impacting on the UAF. It 
included a net assessment of Ukraine's nuclear status, Ukraine's current 
military defense strategy options, the restructured military education system 
that will frame the future forces, and finally, the latest base force figures (1995) 
compared to the initial declared strengths in 1992. This assessment showed 
that although reform has begun in many areas, more changes are required 
before the UAF become a professional force. 
Chapter VI described the complex ethnic situation in Ukraine while it 
was under Soviet rule and than showed how the established "ethnic security 
map" has affected present day Ukraine and its military, by creating ethnic 
imbalance within the armed forces. Contents focused on the theoretical aspect 
of the ethnic issue, by using the works of N.F. Dreiszinger, R.A. Preston, and 
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. This chapter showed how glass ceilings in the 
SAF prevented minorities, like the Ukrainians, from attaining high decision 
making posts within the military infrastructure, and discussed the overall 
"russification" process which attempted to strip the minorities of their culture, 
traditions and customs. This was all done at the expense of minorities like the 
Ukrainians, so that Russian can become the dominant ethnic group. 
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Chapter VII laid out the sociological issues plaguing the UAF, and the 
negative impact they have on morale, discipline, readiness and combat 
sustainability. Subjects discussed included the slow force conversion process 
and the poor quality of life; the language of command and the fight to 
reestablish the Ukrainian language within the fighting forces; the re-education 
program that is attempting to "Ukrainianize" the officer corps; and the civil- 
military relationship that at this time is good. Although the UAF has inherited 
an "ethnic security map" of the former Soviet Union, it has made some progress 
in reversing its effects. Ukraine has successfully waged a reeducation 
campaign to educate the officer corp and its troops through various programs 
that would make them better "Ukrainian" soldiers. Even though additional 
work is still required to make the UAF more patriotic, they are generally loyal 
to the Ukrainian state and its people. 
Chapter Vm focused on military capabilities of the UAF and answered 
the main puzzle question: "Are the UAF a potent and credible deterrent to 
neighboring incursions?" This chapter initially addressed the budgetary 
problems facing the UAF and then applied four major components of military 
capability - force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability - to the 
UAF as a frame of reference. The findings of this research is that the UAF can 
sustain short-term combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the 
potential is there for the Ukrainian army to develop fighting capability to deter 
war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military 
power. It can defend its western borders and for the near term at least, provide 
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a credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from Russia. 
This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other 
components of military capability - force structure, readiness and 
modernization - are brought to projected levels. The economic factors at this 
time seem to hamper quick progress in military reforms. 
Although the Ukrainian armedf orces presently have numerous problems, 
if one studies the relative problems in the RAF, it is possible to state that the 
UAF do act as a deterrent against a potential incursion from the east. However, 
this deterrent presently is not as potent or credible as the Ukrainian Parliament 
would like it to be. With time, it can develop into a more formidable force 
structure that is modern, combat ready, which possesses sustainability. 
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APPENDIX A.  ABSTRACT FROM UKRAINE'S DECLARATION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 
DC. External and Internal Security 
The Ukrainian SSR has the right to its own armed forces. The Ukrainian 
SSR has its own troops of the interior and bodies of state security, subordinate 
to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. The Ukrainian SSR determines the order of 
military service by the citizens of the republic. Citizens of Ukraine carry out 
their miMtary service on the territory of the republic as a rule, and are not 
supposed to be used for military purposes outside the republic without the 
consent of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. The Ukrainian Soviet solemnly 
proclaims its wish to become in the future a neutral state, which does not 
participate in military blocs, and follows three non-nuclear principles: not to 
acquire, produce, or purchase any kind of nuclear weapons. 




APPENDIX B. UKRAINE'S MILITARY OATH OF ALLEGIANCE 
I, (name), upon entering military service, solemnly swear to the people 
of Ukraine to always be faithful and devoted to them, to conscientiously and 
honestly fulfill military duties, the orders of commanders, steadfastly uphold 
the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, safeguarding state and military secrets. 
I swear to defend the Ukrainian state, firmly stand for her freedom and 
independence. 
I swear to never betray the people of Ukraine. 
[Narodnaia armiia, 4 January 1992, page 1] 
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APPENDIX C. MILITARY DOCTRINE OF UKRAINE 
1. The Doctrine was approved by the Parliament on 19 October 1993. The 
Doctrine has three sections and 8 subsections. In the first section, "Military and 
Political Aspects" the following subsections are included: 
• Military and political purposes of Ukraine and international priorities 
in ensuring national security. 
• Causes of military unsafely. Ukraine's attitude to war. 
• Attitude of Ukraine to nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
2. In the second section "Military and Technical Aspects" the following 
subsections are included: 
• Basic ways to ensure military security. 
• Tasks of Armed Forces and principles of their construction. 
• Training Armed Forces for defense against aggression. 
3. In the third section "Military and Economic Aspects" the following 
subsections are included: 
• The purpose and principle of military economic policy. 
• Preparation of the state and the population to the defense. 
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4. The Military Doctrine of Ukraine declares universally recognized 
principles and norms of international law and first of all those fixed in the UN 
Charter, Helsinki Concluding Act and the documents of Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Among the detailed principles we emphasize the 
following: 
• It is against allocation of foreign armies on Ukrainian territory. 
• The doctrine forbids to use Ukrainian own armed forces to solve 
political problems on Ukrainian territory. 
• Exclude its unilateral complete disarmament. 
• Promote creation of reliable international mechanisms and all-Europe 
structure of safety on bilateral, regional and global levels with the 
purposes of enforcement of confidence and partnership based on 
principles of mutual understanding and openness military political 
activity. 
• Keep the status of a non-joining country. 
5. According to its Military Doctrine, Ukraine will consider a state 
consistent policy of which contains military danger for Ukraine, leads to 
intervention to Ukraine's domestic affairs, encroachment on its territorial 
integrity and on national interests, to be its political antagonists. 
6. Ukraine respects the right to freedom of social political choice of each 
state and excludes military intervention in its domestic affairs. 
7. Attitude of Ukraine to nuclear arms and other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction is, firstly, its intention to become a non-nuclear state in future; 
reduction and destroying nuclear arms allocated on its territory, connected with 
128 
adequate actions of other states and providing with reliable guarantees of its 
security by them and by world community. As to techniques of production of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Ukraine is against their spreading. 
8.        Military security of Ukraine is achieved by means of: 
• Ability to carry out military actions on land, sea> in near space and in 
air. 
• Equipment of Military Forces with modern means of armed struggle. 
In doing so, Ukraine must be ready to detach appropriate military 
contingents to UN forces for carrying out military actions to suppress 
aggressive actions of some states or some groups of states, as well as to support 
peace and security in different regions, according to the decision of the Security 
Council. According to the Doctrine, military security of Ukraine may also be 
ensued by creation of zones, free from weapons of mass destruction, and 
regional security systems. 
9. The main task of the Armed Forces is to defend independence, territorial 
integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine. The basic principles of construction of 
Armed Forces are: 
Recruitment on the basis of general military service and by contrasts, 
with gradual change to professional army. 
Complete departization (ban for military servicemen to participate in 
activity of political parties and movements). 
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10. One of the most important principles of Armed Forces in the Doctrine is 
formulated as follows: 'in balance construction of kinds of Armed Forces and 
special forces. Priority will be given to highly powerful high-accuracy weapons, 
means of reconnaissance, airmobile units, air-space defense perspective types 
of vessels and submarines. 
11. Basic principles of military economic policy of Ukraine are: 
• Using competitive approach to development and production of new 
weapons and military equipment. 
• Achievement of high ease of manufacture of weapons systems and 
necessary level of unification of their elements. 
• Rational conversion of military productions. 
[Tri K" Company - Private Scientific Research Bureau, "Ukraine Today"] 
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APPENDIX D. ATTITUDE OF UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS TOWARDS THE 
DOCTRINE 
1.        Leonid Kuchma: 
I do not want Ukraine to become a sort of sanitary border 
or barrier between East and West. 
I do not quite understand non-block status of Ukraine.   [Golos 
Ukrainy, 30 November 1994] 
Mr G. Udovenko, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
We did not rely only on the West. And it is impossible to 
say that we do not understand the importance of relations with 
Russia. Now our first and foremost task is normalization of our 
relations with Russia, improvement and development of ties with 
CIS countries. I consider our relations with Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Baltic states to be of the greatest importance. We 
did not yet appraise the phenomenon of Far East countries: 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore which developed themselves fast. 
We did not have the concept of our relations with such countries 
as Egypt, United Arabian Emirates. Our relations with the United 
States of America is very important. To put it short the USA 
should guarantee our nuclear safety. Having declared ourselves 
the state without nuclear weapons we did not get guarantees of 
our security. We do not reject to follow this course but where are 
concrete steps of the USA.  [Golos Ukrainy, No 176, 1994] 
Mr Valery Shmarov, Defense Minister of Ukraine: 
It was not easy to form Armed Forces of a new state having 
three separate military districts subordinate to Moscow. 
Today first of all it is necessary not to rattle the sabre but 
to make preventive inspection of peace in surrounding world. 
This is more suitable for civil and not military people. It is 
possible that we will even engage diplomats. 
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Ukraine is a non-block state. That is why we are not going 
to join either NATO or CIS Military Block. It contradicts our 
legislation. However our cooperation with the East and West, 
South and North should develop. We should provide our security 
by diplomatic means and have negotiations with all the neighbors. 
With Russia as well as with other CIS-countries we have wide 
bonds on military and technical supply. 
In the nearest future we should zealously use what we 
already have and modernize it if possible...We cannot presently 
create the whole spectrum of modern arms but it does not mean 
that we do not try. I think in ten years we will have out first 
patterns.  [Nezavisimost, 12 October 1994] 
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APPENDIXE. UKRAINE AND RUSSIA 
1. "14 foreign bases are situated on the territory of Ukraine." [Fortune, 19 
November 1994] 
2. Russian Intelligence Service:   From the report "Russia-CIS: Does the 
Position of West Need to be Corrected ?" 
The necessity of creation of common defense space within the 
limits of CIS increases. For Russia this necessity is redoubled by 
the fact that after disintegration of the USSR many objects 
essential for normal functioning of 'deterrent system' now are 
situated outside Russia. [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No 181, 
September 1994] 
Boris Yeltsin has already exhausted all his reserves of concessions to the 
West and now has to become aggressive not only in home affairs but in 
foreign as well. Mr Yeltsin indicated it is necessary to pay special 
attention to preparation of the army to possible local armed conflicts on 
the borders of Russian Federation, to be ready for deployment of highly 
mobile units in areas of menace. In principle, mobile units inside the 
country may have the same task which is stipulated by new military 
doctrine of Russia.  [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 November 1994] 
Agreements signed by Ukrainian and Russian sides during Moscow 
Meeting (among them 'On the order of mutual supplies of weapons and 
military equipment, spare parts....organization of military services and 
'On cooperation in the field of creation and exploitation of space rocket 
and rocket equipment1) were considered by many observers to be a step 
towards military and political union of Russia and Ukraine. Possibility 
of such estimation was proved by recently published report made by 
Intelligence Service of Russian Federation. In the report three possible 
scenarios of development of integrational processes in CIS is given and 
the following conclusion is made: economic, political and military 
integration corresponds to the requirements of our time and guarantees 
stabilization of situation in CIS.   [Nezavisimost, 30 September 1994] 
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5.     Dr Serguey Pirozhkov, Director of National Institute of Strategic 
Research on Perspectives of Ukrainian-Russian Relations: 
Ukraine cannot expect wide and clearly expressed support 
of the West if it would have strained relations with Russia. In 
other words the USA and West European countries will not 
undertake extreme measures to deter Russian aggression towards 
Ukraine if such situation will take place. 
On the other hand one should mention that Ukraine and 
Russia have common interests. These interests are: MIC 
conversion, development of new brunches of industry producing 
mass consumption goods. Efficient cooperation of both countries 
in war industry and ecological problems solution is also possible. 
Unfortunately, no progress except future perspectives can be seen 
in this field.   [Holos Ukrainy, 18 November 1994] 
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APPENDIX F. UKRAINE AND THE CIS 
1.       Secretary of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers Mr. L. Ivashov: 
No republic except Russia has its own military-industrial base for 
producing finished military equipment and weapons.... creation of 
the defense union as well as its main part - United Armed Forces - 
is a long term process. Calculations have shown that it took not 
less than 2-3 years as far as joining of Russia and other 
republics NATO Partnership for Peace Program is concerned I 
believe that too much attention is paid to this question. We have 
other more important problems we should solve. [Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, No 90, May 1994] 
2. Mr. Andronik Migranian, member of the President's Council, counsellor 
of 'Reforms' Fund, chief expert of the Committee on CIS affairs in the 
State Duma of Russian Federation, considers it strange that Russian 
diplomats dealing with Ukraine use to narrow strategic partnership with 
Ukraine and see it only as economic cooperation which has nothing in 
common with strategic partnership itself. We should prevent the attempt 
of creation of geopolitical pluralism on the territory of the former USSR 
and try not only in words but in deeds begin to advance multilevel 




APPENDIX G. TREATY ON ORDINARY ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE 
Leonid Kuchma: 
...We should change the essence of our military reforms and 
create a mobile army not only by means of its mechanical 
reducement but effectively using the means we get from its 
reducement... [Holos Ukrainy, No. 105, 1994] 
Leonid Kuchma: 
We have the chance to become the first country in the world 
which is not able to cope with its own industrial and military 
potential, create ecological danger for other countries. [Holos 
Ukrainy, 13 October 1994] 
Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe 
Treaty on Ordinary Armed Forces in Europe was signed on 
November 19, 1990, by the USSR and was ratified without any 
changes in July 1992 by Ukraine. The treaty terms for Ukraine 
include, that within a 40 month period, until November 1995, 
Ukraine should reduce: more than 2,000 tanks, 1,500 armored cars 
and 550 battle planes. Within 21 months, April 1, 1994, Ukraine 
has reduced: 721 tanks, 544 armored cars and 174 battle planes. 
According to the Treaty after November 1995 Ukraine should not 
exceed the following amount of military equipment: 4,080 tanks, 
5,050 armored cars, 4,040 artillery systems with caliber 100mm 
and more, 1,090 battle planes and 330 battle helicopters. During 
this period of time Ukraine was inspected by international bodies 
141 times. [Holos Ukrainy, No 60, April 1994] 
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Mr V. Lemish, Chief of Defense Department in the Cabinet of Ministers: 
Our army enters the XXI century with backward technical 
equipment and weapons and we cannot modernize or at least 
maintain our weapons in fighting trim because all the parts are 
delivered by Russia. And the main thing: we have no money. 
[Kievskie Vedomosti, 9 August 1994] 
5.        Dr. V. Kulish: 
We have intellectual potential enough to reach world's front 
line in relatively short terms and without great budget expenses. 
Today we already have some things to the working out of which 
the USA have not yet started. 
In Ukraine one cannot yet see serious intentions for the 
creation of scientifically grounded and realistic defense 
conception.  [Holos Ukrainy, 26 November 1994] 
6. Ukraine has started national military standardization. At the same time 
it joined CIS agreement on common standardization of weapons and military 
equipment.   [Kommersant Ukrainy, 21 December 1994] 
138 







c «3 ? 

















I    o 




03   U-. i_ 
E  o 3 
E  c U 
o   u 
U ."H 







o.SJ \s > 
ra









«>   E    c 
J § = t3 co ^ 
J;    CO    O ■2 55"? 
§■§<§ 
.2   "i   E 
=   
c
   V C   o   u
£    M    3 


















TO     CO 
2    =0 O    O 
b < 
S E ■5 i) 
o 
o 
C     ,     vi 













o > o cd 







3.2 b F u D o 
U 
Q   S    K- 






c    . 















E «3 c 
E o 
o 
U CO Z 










<=    1 u 


















U o 4> 
1 p r 






















CO 73 fes O 
o o 























o k. ft. 
Supreme Command ~ Republic of Ukraine 
139 
140 
APPENDIX I. TROOP STRENGTH (000) 
Ukraine's Shrinking Military. Bar Graph. 




APPENDIX J. UKRAINE'S MILITARY BALANCE:   1994-1995 (Figures 
reflect force levels as of October 1994) 
I. TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 
A. ACTIVE: 517,000 (excluding Strategic Nuclear Forces and Black 
Sea Fleet; including 47,000 in central staff and units not covered 
below). 
B. RESERVES: some 1 million with military service within 5 years. 
II. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES:   (ownership and control disputed) 
A. ICBM: 
SS-19 Stiletto (RS-18):   110 (at two sites) 
SS-24 Scalpel (RS-22): 46 (silo-based, one site co-located with SS- 
19) (said to have been deactivated). 
B. BOMBERS: 42: 23 Tu-95H (with AS-15 ALCM), 19 Tu-160 (with 
AS-15ALCM) (under Ukrainian command). 
HI. GROUND FORCES: 308,000 
MOD tps:   1 TD (trg), 1 arty div, 1 arty, 1 ATK, 3 engr bde 
A. WESTERN OP COMMAND: 
1. Comd tps: 1 arty div (1 arty, 1 MRL, 1 ATK bde), 1 TD 
(trg), 1 engr regt. 
2. 3 Corps: 1 with MRD (1 reserve), 2 mech (1 reserve), 1 
arty, 1 engr bde, 1 MRL, 1 ATK regt. 1 with 2 mech div, 1 
mech, 1 arty bde, 1ATK, 1 MRL regt (both reserve). 1 with 
1TD, 1 ATK regt. 
B. SOUTHERN OP COMMAND: 
1. Comd tps: 2 mech div (1 trg), 1 air-mobile div, 1 arty div, 
2 arty bde (1 reserve). 
2. 3 Corps: 1 with 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde, 1 ATK, 1 MRL regt 
(last 3 reserve).    1 with I MRD (reserve), 1 mech div, 1 
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MRL, 1 ATK (reserve) regt. 1 with 1 TD, 2 mech div, 1 arty 
bde, 1 ATK, 1 MRL regt. 
Other units (subordination not known) 2 SF (Spetsnatz), 7 
SSM bde, 8 SAM bde/regt. 
C.       EQUIPMENT: 
MBT:   some 5,380 (incl some 1,400 in store):  1,030 T-54/-55, 285 
T-62, 2,400 T-64, 1,320 T-72, 345 T-80. 
LIGHT TANKS:   50 PT-76. 
RECCE:   some 2,000, incl 520 BRM. 
AIFV: some 3,026: 1,450 BMP-1,1,450 BMP-2,6 BMP-3,120 BMD 
APC:    some 2,190: 400 BTR-60,  1,300 BTR-70, 450 BTR-80, 
40 BTR-D; plus 1,100 MT-LB, 3,000 look-alikes.' 
TOTAL ARTY:   3,638: 
TOWED ARTY:  1,050: 122mm: 400 D-30; 152mm: 200 D-20, 175 
2A65, 275 2A36. 
SP ARTY:   1,304:     122m:  640 S;   152mm:  500 2S3, 24 2S5, 
40 2S19, 203 mm: 100 2S7. 
COMBINED GUN/MORTAR:   120mm: 64 2S9. 
MRL: 640:  122mm: 375 BM-21, 25 9P138;  132mm: 5 BM-13; 
220mm: 140 9P140; 300mm: 95 9A52. 
MORTARS:  580:   120mm:  330 2S12, 250 PM-38. 
SSM:   132 Scud, 140 Frog/SS-21. 
ATGW: AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-6 Spiral. 
SAM:  SA-4/-6/-8/-11/-12A/-15. 
SURV: SNAR-10 (big Fred), Small Fred (arty) 
IV.     AIR FORCE (incl Air Defense): 146,000; some 993 cbt ac, plus 440 in 
store (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29), 307 attack hel. 3 air army, 1 
PVO army (3 AD regions). 
BOMBERS: 2 div HQ, 3 regt (1 trg) with 11 Tu-16, 33 Tu-22, 30 Tu-22M. 
FGA/BOMBER: 2 div HQ, 5 regt with 161 Su-24. 
FGA:   1 regt with 34 Su-25. 
FIGHTER: 2 div (8 regt), 3 PVO div (8 regt) with 145 MiG-23, 79 
MiG-25, 172 MiG-29, 59 Su-15, 67 Su-27. 
RECCE:   4 regt with 38 Tu-16, 22 Tu-22, 41 Su-17, 36 Su-24, 15 
MiG-25. 
ECM:  1 regt with 22 Yak-28, 7 Su-24. 
TRANSPORT:   174 IL-76, 100 others incl An-12. 
TRAINING: 4 centres, 10 regts with 50 Su-24, 475 L-39/L-29. 
HELICOPTERS: 
ATTACK:  307 Mi-24. 
SUPPORT:  58 Mi-6, 132 Mi-8, 20 Mi-26. 
SAM:  825:  SA-2/-3/-5/-10. 
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V. NAVY: E16,000 (incl 7,000 Naval Aviation, 5,000 Coastal Defense) 
(planned total is probably 40,000). 
BASES:  Sevastopol, Odessa. 
PRINCIPLE SURFACE COMBATANTS:   4: 2 Krivak III PCO, 1 
Petya-II FF, 1 Grisha V FF. 
OTHER SURFACE SHIPS:   1 Slavutich (Sov Kamchatka) comd 
vessel, some 40 coastal, inshore and riverine patrol craft, incl 
Grisha n, Zhuk, Pauk I, Stenka, Muravey and Shemel classes, 1 
or 2 all log spt vessels; 2 large Pomornik hovercraft (capacity 3 tkr 
or 10APC, 300 tps). 
BLACK SEA FLEET:   (E48,000) (HQ Sevastopol): since August 
1992 the Black Sea Fleet has been controlled de jure, jointly by 
Russia and Ukraine.  In practice, this has been de facto Russian 
control. Some, mainly minor, units of the Fleet have already been 
transferee to Ukraine and promised to Georgia. 
NAVAL AVIATION: (7,000): 7 regts with 68 MiG-29, 43 Su-17, 44 
Su-25, 10 Tu-16, 39 Tu-22M (Tu-16, Tu-22M also listed by Russia 
inCFEdata). 
COASTAL DEFENSE TROOPS: (5,000) (listed by both Ukraine and 
Russia inCFEdata). 
1 Coast Defense div (Reserve). 
2 marine inf regt. 
EQUIPMENT: 
MBT:  244T-64. 
AIFV:   140 BMP-1, 150 BMD. 
APC:  20 BMP-60, 150 BTR-70, 200 BTR-70. 
TOWED ARTY:  72 D-30. 
SPARTY:  23 2S1. 
COMBINED GUN/MORTAR: 24 2S9. 
VI. FORCES ABROAD: 
UN AND PEACEKEEPING: 
BOSNIA:   (UNPROFOR BH): 580; 1 inf bn, plus 9 civ pol. 
CROATIA:   (UNPROFOR I): 547; 1 inf bn. 
VII. PARAMILITARY FORCES:  66,000. 
NATIONAL GUARD: 23,000 (to be 30,000; former MVD eqpt in service). 
BORDER GUARD: (incl Coast Guard): 43,000; about 40 minor units ex- 
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On January /4, /994, Ukraine agreed to transferal/ of its nuclear warheads to Russia pursuant to a Trilateral Statement with the United States and 
Russia. It has surpassed the expected ra/e of transfer. In addition, on November 16, 1994, the Vkranian parliament approved Ukraine~ accession to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ukraine deposited its instrument of accession on December 5, 1~94. 
Ul:mW IJ CIUTUIIty ddctii'Qling ilS ICBMsiJIId IJ 
tronsferring~D~U of ilS warlllodl10 Rlalill; ~ lw 
agreed 10 tronsfer all IIJI<:Itar WtapOIU on ilS t<rritory 
Ia Rtusia 1111 kll(r tlldlt 1997. 
OptruJ/oni;J~~J~<:Itarpawerlllllion(s); Ul:mW 
lw ag,.ed 10 ploce allltJ p«<efid ~~J~<:Itar 
DCiiYilks under /A£4 inspection (nudtar 
weapons, which Dl't not under Uktunian 
operational conJro/, .,. e.u:Wdtd~ 
ICBM pn:>duction, t<sting/lrainbrg, 
convtnionltlinUnlllion. or storagtfadlities; 
possible pruence of ICBMs (blll110t/CBM 
warh<odl~ . 
lta/iciHd /fatf1ll rrpmtnl situ of proliferation cone em 
~~·~~~~:~~~~ ·:~·, .. :~~· ~ :~:c~~ 
f..ocmlon of severo! huJvy-
W<lttr pn:>duclion plants giving 
Ukraine 1M capability 10 
pn:>duce aballl 250 ""'tric toni 
of htavy-wattr per year. 
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wattr to a cowttry with 
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enhance 1M recipitnl COUIIIr)'~ 
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for nuclear weapons. 
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APPENDIX L. WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS IN UKRAINE 
TYPE WEAPON 
SYSTEMS: 
1990 START I 
M0U/ 1994 
START 1 MOU/ 
CURRENT 
WARHEADS: 
1990 START 1 MOU/ 
1994 START I MOU/ 
CURRENT 
LOCATJON 
(# OF WEAPON 
SYSTEMS: 
1990 START I MOU/ 


















780/624/234 Khmel'nitskiy (90/84/NA) 
Pervomaysk (40/20/NA) 
42 SS-19s may have been 








46/46/0 460/460/0 Pervomaysk (46/46/0) Under the terms of the 
Trilateral Statement, all SS- 
24s have been deactivated. 
Some SS-24s may have 
been removed from their 
silos.41  Warheads are 




494/580/580 494/580/580 Bomber loadings are based 
on START II counting rules 
and reflect a current total of 
46 strategic bombers.42 
Long-range 
ALCMs 
492/578/578 492/578/578 Uzin (336/350/350) 
Priluki (156/228/228) 
Nineteen Blackjack bombers 
(carrying up to 12 ALCMs) 
are at Priluki.  Twenty Bear 
HI6 bombers (carrying up 
to. 16 ALCMs) and 5 Bear 
H6 bombers (carrying up to 
6 ALCMs) are based at 
Uzin."   All ALCMs are 
believed to be in storage at 
or near bomber bases. All 
bombers and missiles are 





2/2/2 2/2/2 Uzin (2/2/2) One Bear A and one Bear B 
in storage at Uzin each may 




NA/NA/NA NA/NA/app.  150 Likely site is 
Pervomaysk" 
Over 390 SS-19 warheads 
and 460 SS-24 warheads 
had been removed from 
missiles by February 1995, 
and approximately 700 
warheads had been sent to 
Russia under the terms of 
the Trilateral Statement.47 
Weapons Systems and Warheads in Ukraine 
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APPENDIX M.  MILITARY BUDGET SPENDING AS A % OF GDP 
Bar Graph. Financial Times, Friday, 24 March 
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